對于投資者、銀行家和政客們而言,激勵至關(guān)重要。資深評論員吉姆·格蘭特對此的了解,遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過許多撰稿人。格蘭特從事金融報道超過50年,曾任職于Barron’s,從1983年開始自主創(chuàng)業(yè),他是每周時事通訊《格蘭特利率觀察》(Grant’s Interest Rate Observer)的作者。格蘭特總是戴著眼鏡和領(lǐng)結(jié)。他的專欄和許多著作都批評了美聯(lián)儲的印鈔策略,并強調(diào)了他杜撰的一個角色“市場先生”有缺陷的假設(shè)。有一本書的出版恰逢其時,那就是2008年的《失算的市場先生:泡沫年代與后泡沫年代》(Mr. Market Miscalculates: The Bubble Years and Beyond),《金融時報》當(dāng)時對這本書給予了積極評價,約翰·奧瑟斯稱贊書中有許多“神秘的預(yù)知未來的例子”,并且格蘭特具有“出色的幽默感”。本周末,格蘭特表示,近十年來,美聯(lián)儲忽視了激勵的重要性,而經(jīng)濟正在為又一次失算付出代價。
他周日對MarketWatch表示:“美聯(lián)儲是美國財政面臨的頭號問題?!彼赋?,數(shù)十年來,美聯(lián)儲用“雖然是無意的但并非完全不可預(yù)測的”方式,破壞了美國的市場和經(jīng)濟。
格蘭特在數(shù)十年來觀察市場的過程中,成功預(yù)測了許多錯誤。例如,2004年,他警告華盛頓互惠銀行(Washington Mutual)存在問題,約四年后的2008年9月,該銀行倒閉。他表示,該銀行高風(fēng)險抵押貸款的占比從5%提高到40%,一旦美聯(lián)儲加息,會導(dǎo)致普通美國人面臨失去房子的風(fēng)險。這些高風(fēng)險抵押貸款的利率可進行調(diào)整,并且本金支付可以延期,又被稱為“可選擇性調(diào)整利率貸款”。
格蘭特在2004年的專欄文章中寫道:“1994年,美聯(lián)儲提高基金利率,令對沖基金和利率投機者措手不及。美聯(lián)儲下一次提高基金利率,會讓普通美國人措手不及?!?/p>
數(shù)十年來,格蘭特曾多次警告,經(jīng)過歷史性低利率周期之后,快速加息會讓投資者和CEO們毫無防備,將引發(fā)嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟問題,而且他認(rèn)為這種情況目前正在重新上演。
他表示,過去14個月,美聯(lián)儲官員為了應(yīng)對通脹,以前所未有的速度加息,去年6月美國通脹率達到史上最高的9.1%。隨著供應(yīng)鏈趨于穩(wěn)定和大宗商品價格下降,美聯(lián)儲上個月成功將消費物價同比漲幅下降到4.9%,但這依舊遠(yuǎn)高于2%的目標(biāo),這意味著美聯(lián)儲還會繼續(xù)加息。
更高利率與大多數(shù)投資者和銀行業(yè)者早已習(xí)以為常的情況截然不同。在全球金融危機爆發(fā)后的數(shù)年間,以及在疫情期間,美聯(lián)儲將利率維持在接近于零的水平,希望刺激貸款和投資,提振經(jīng)濟。格蘭特表示,這種所謂的“免費資金時代”激勵投資者和銀行業(yè)者追逐高風(fēng)險資產(chǎn),因為美國國債、儲蓄賬戶和投資級債券等常見的避險資產(chǎn),并不能帶來高額匯報。
他解釋稱:“我認(rèn)為,通常情況下,壓低利率會導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟扭曲。這會鼓勵人們追逐成長型資產(chǎn),就像趴在地上拿著手電筒在家具下面找東西一樣,希望自己的儲蓄能夠帶來一些回報?!?/p>
在2020年和2021年期間,在加息的大環(huán)境下,投資者們追捧的高風(fēng)險資產(chǎn)去年表現(xiàn)不佳,科技股下跌約30%,加密貨幣的市值縮水了2萬億美元(為之前市值的三分之二)。
格蘭特的警告得到了另外一位知名財經(jīng)評論員和作家愛德華·錢塞勒的認(rèn)可。錢塞勒在2022年初稱通貨膨脹是央行無能“遺留的問題”。 2022年晚些時候,錢塞勒出版了《時間的價格》(The Price of Time)一書,分析了利率的歷史。他認(rèn)為,在數(shù)百年歷史中,各國央行曾多次扭曲“自然利率”,造成了災(zāi)難性的后果。
金本位支持者的嘆息
格蘭特認(rèn)為,持續(xù)多年的低利率還導(dǎo)致銀行高管追求更高收益,促使他們投資長期債券,這些債券雖然提供相對更高的回報,但一旦利率上漲就會面臨風(fēng)險。他指出,銀行業(yè)最近曝出的許多問題,包括硅谷銀行(Silicon Valley Bank)和第一共和銀行(First Republic Bank)倒閉,都與這個問題有關(guān)。簡而言之,銀行業(yè)者收購的資產(chǎn)所支付的收益,不足以支付持續(xù)上漲的存款支出,當(dāng)投資者發(fā)現(xiàn)這種狀況后,就會導(dǎo)致銀行擠兌。
格蘭德?lián)?,美?lián)儲的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表存在類似問題,因為在全球金融危機之后,美聯(lián)儲采取了具有爭議的量化寬松政策,希望能夠刺激經(jīng)濟增長。美聯(lián)儲在開放市場收購政府債券和抵押貸款擔(dān)保證券,希望增加經(jīng)濟中的貸款和投資,并維持低利率。
格蘭特多年來一直批評寬松貨幣政策,這讓他收獲了許多支持保守貨幣政策的粉絲,或古典經(jīng)濟學(xué)的粉絲。例如,前共和黨人羅恩·保羅憑借“審計美聯(lián)儲”的競選口號,成為2012年總統(tǒng)大選共和黨初選中的一匹黑馬。他表示格蘭特是取代美聯(lián)儲主席本·伯南克的更佳人選。最近,格蘭德撰寫的銀行家、前《經(jīng)濟學(xué)人》編輯沃爾特·白芝浩的傳記贏得了經(jīng)濟學(xué)建制派的積極評價。諷刺的是,在2008年金融危機之后的大衰退期間,伯南克的許多財政措施都受到了白芝浩的影響。周日,格蘭特再次批評伯南克。
他提到前美聯(lián)儲主席本·伯南克和量化寬松政策時表示:“我認(rèn)為,伯南克領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的美聯(lián)儲在2010至2011年期間提出的觀點,從長遠(yuǎn)來看是非常非常危險的主張。我并不認(rèn)為它發(fā)揮了作用。當(dāng)然,美聯(lián)儲并不是第一共和銀行,但其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表與第一共和銀行和硅谷銀行類似,其資產(chǎn)的收益率為2%,而債務(wù)償還率卻高達4%至5%?!?/p>
長期近零利率還會激勵政府增加支出,因為低利率可減少國家債務(wù)支付的利息。但隨著利率上漲,而且在政治分歧日益加劇的當(dāng)下,美國即將達到31.4萬億美元的債務(wù)上限,因此有越來越多人擔(dān)心美國可能無力償還債務(wù),而格蘭特認(rèn)為這至少在一定程度上要歸咎于美聯(lián)儲的政策。
這是為什么格蘭特認(rèn)為“過去10年或12年的美聯(lián)儲政策和總體上壓低利率”,為最近區(qū)域銀行的問題和“債務(wù)戲碼”奠定了基礎(chǔ)。
對于投資者,格蘭特表示這意味著黃金這種世界上最古老的避險資產(chǎn),是唯一值得擁有的資產(chǎn)。與他的好朋友和支持者羅恩·保羅一樣,格蘭特一直被金融界稱為“金本位支持者”,他認(rèn)為理查德·尼克松總統(tǒng)1971年決定放棄金本位是一個錯誤,為美聯(lián)儲的胡作非為打開了大門。即使到現(xiàn)在,隨著美聯(lián)儲加息,他擔(dān)心通貨膨脹將依舊難以根除,使黃金成為一種珍貴的資產(chǎn)。他說道,就像在煤礦里的火災(zāi)一樣,我們并非總還能看到通貨膨脹,但它一直在燃燒。
格蘭特在7月接受希夫·古爾德采訪時表示:“我一直主張堅持金本位。我會繼續(xù)堅持這樣的主張,并且我注意到,人們至今沒有正視自1971年以來開始執(zhí)行的貨幣制度固有的根本缺點?!保ㄘ敻恢形木W(wǎng))
翻譯:劉進龍
審校:汪皓
對于投資者、銀行家和政客們而言,激勵至關(guān)重要。資深評論員吉姆·格蘭特對此的了解,遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過許多撰稿人。格蘭特從事金融報道超過50年,曾任職于Barron’s,從1983年開始自主創(chuàng)業(yè),他是每周時事通訊《格蘭特利率觀察》(Grant’s Interest Rate Observer)的作者。格蘭特總是戴著眼鏡和領(lǐng)結(jié)。他的專欄和許多著作都批評了美聯(lián)儲的印鈔策略,并強調(diào)了他杜撰的一個角色“市場先生”有缺陷的假設(shè)。有一本書的出版恰逢其時,那就是2008年的《失算的市場先生:泡沫年代與后泡沫年代》(Mr. Market Miscalculates: The Bubble Years and Beyond),《金融時報》當(dāng)時對這本書給予了積極評價,約翰·奧瑟斯稱贊書中有許多“神秘的預(yù)知未來的例子”,并且格蘭特具有“出色的幽默感”。本周末,格蘭特表示,近十年來,美聯(lián)儲忽視了激勵的重要性,而經(jīng)濟正在為又一次失算付出代價。
他周日對MarketWatch表示:“美聯(lián)儲是美國財政面臨的頭號問題。”他指出,數(shù)十年來,美聯(lián)儲用“雖然是無意的但并非完全不可預(yù)測的”方式,破壞了美國的市場和經(jīng)濟。
格蘭特在數(shù)十年來觀察市場的過程中,成功預(yù)測了許多錯誤。例如,2004年,他警告華盛頓互惠銀行(Washington Mutual)存在問題,約四年后的2008年9月,該銀行倒閉。他表示,該銀行高風(fēng)險抵押貸款的占比從5%提高到40%,一旦美聯(lián)儲加息,會導(dǎo)致普通美國人面臨失去房子的風(fēng)險。這些高風(fēng)險抵押貸款的利率可進行調(diào)整,并且本金支付可以延期,又被稱為“可選擇性調(diào)整利率貸款”。
格蘭特在2004年的專欄文章中寫道:“1994年,美聯(lián)儲提高基金利率,令對沖基金和利率投機者措手不及。美聯(lián)儲下一次提高基金利率,會讓普通美國人措手不及?!?/p>
數(shù)十年來,格蘭特曾多次警告,經(jīng)過歷史性低利率周期之后,快速加息會讓投資者和CEO們毫無防備,將引發(fā)嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟問題,而且他認(rèn)為這種情況目前正在重新上演。
他表示,過去14個月,美聯(lián)儲官員為了應(yīng)對通脹,以前所未有的速度加息,去年6月美國通脹率達到史上最高的9.1%。隨著供應(yīng)鏈趨于穩(wěn)定和大宗商品價格下降,美聯(lián)儲上個月成功將消費物價同比漲幅下降到4.9%,但這依舊遠(yuǎn)高于2%的目標(biāo),這意味著美聯(lián)儲還會繼續(xù)加息。
更高利率與大多數(shù)投資者和銀行業(yè)者早已習(xí)以為常的情況截然不同。在全球金融危機爆發(fā)后的數(shù)年間,以及在疫情期間,美聯(lián)儲將利率維持在接近于零的水平,希望刺激貸款和投資,提振經(jīng)濟。格蘭特表示,這種所謂的“免費資金時代”激勵投資者和銀行業(yè)者追逐高風(fēng)險資產(chǎn),因為美國國債、儲蓄賬戶和投資級債券等常見的避險資產(chǎn),并不能帶來高額匯報。
他解釋稱:“我認(rèn)為,通常情況下,壓低利率會導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟扭曲。這會鼓勵人們追逐成長型資產(chǎn),就像趴在地上拿著手電筒在家具下面找東西一樣,希望自己的儲蓄能夠帶來一些回報?!?/p>
在2020年和2021年期間,在加息的大環(huán)境下,投資者們追捧的高風(fēng)險資產(chǎn)去年表現(xiàn)不佳,科技股下跌約30%,加密貨幣的市值縮水了2萬億美元(為之前市值的三分之二)。
格蘭特的警告得到了另外一位知名財經(jīng)評論員和作家愛德華·錢塞勒的認(rèn)可。錢塞勒在2022年初稱通貨膨脹是央行無能“遺留的問題”。 2022年晚些時候,錢塞勒出版了《時間的價格》(The Price of Time)一書,分析了利率的歷史。他認(rèn)為,在數(shù)百年歷史中,各國央行曾多次扭曲“自然利率”,造成了災(zāi)難性的后果。
金本位支持者的嘆息
格蘭特認(rèn)為,持續(xù)多年的低利率還導(dǎo)致銀行高管追求更高收益,促使他們投資長期債券,這些債券雖然提供相對更高的回報,但一旦利率上漲就會面臨風(fēng)險。他指出,銀行業(yè)最近曝出的許多問題,包括硅谷銀行(Silicon Valley Bank)和第一共和銀行(First Republic Bank)倒閉,都與這個問題有關(guān)。簡而言之,銀行業(yè)者收購的資產(chǎn)所支付的收益,不足以支付持續(xù)上漲的存款支出,當(dāng)投資者發(fā)現(xiàn)這種狀況后,就會導(dǎo)致銀行擠兌。
格蘭德?lián)?,美?lián)儲的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表存在類似問題,因為在全球金融危機之后,美聯(lián)儲采取了具有爭議的量化寬松政策,希望能夠刺激經(jīng)濟增長。美聯(lián)儲在開放市場收購政府債券和抵押貸款擔(dān)保證券,希望增加經(jīng)濟中的貸款和投資,并維持低利率。
格蘭特多年來一直批評寬松貨幣政策,這讓他收獲了許多支持保守貨幣政策的粉絲,或古典經(jīng)濟學(xué)的粉絲。例如,前共和黨人羅恩·保羅憑借“審計美聯(lián)儲”的競選口號,成為2012年總統(tǒng)大選共和黨初選中的一匹黑馬。他表示格蘭特是取代美聯(lián)儲主席本·伯南克的更佳人選。最近,格蘭德撰寫的銀行家、前《經(jīng)濟學(xué)人》編輯沃爾特·白芝浩的傳記贏得了經(jīng)濟學(xué)建制派的積極評價。諷刺的是,在2008年金融危機之后的大衰退期間,伯南克的許多財政措施都受到了白芝浩的影響。周日,格蘭特再次批評伯南克。
他提到前美聯(lián)儲主席本·伯南克和量化寬松政策時表示:“我認(rèn)為,伯南克領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的美聯(lián)儲在2010至2011年期間提出的觀點,從長遠(yuǎn)來看是非常非常危險的主張。我并不認(rèn)為它發(fā)揮了作用。當(dāng)然,美聯(lián)儲并不是第一共和銀行,但其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表與第一共和銀行和硅谷銀行類似,其資產(chǎn)的收益率為2%,而債務(wù)償還率卻高達4%至5%?!?/p>
長期近零利率還會激勵政府增加支出,因為低利率可減少國家債務(wù)支付的利息。但隨著利率上漲,而且在政治分歧日益加劇的當(dāng)下,美國即將達到31.4萬億美元的債務(wù)上限,因此有越來越多人擔(dān)心美國可能無力償還債務(wù),而格蘭特認(rèn)為這至少在一定程度上要歸咎于美聯(lián)儲的政策。
這是為什么格蘭特認(rèn)為“過去10年或12年的美聯(lián)儲政策和總體上壓低利率”,為最近區(qū)域銀行的問題和“債務(wù)戲碼”奠定了基礎(chǔ)。
對于投資者,格蘭特表示這意味著黃金這種世界上最古老的避險資產(chǎn),是唯一值得擁有的資產(chǎn)。與他的好朋友和支持者羅恩·保羅一樣,格蘭特一直被金融界稱為“金本位支持者”,他認(rèn)為理查德·尼克松總統(tǒng)1971年決定放棄金本位是一個錯誤,為美聯(lián)儲的胡作非為打開了大門。即使到現(xiàn)在,隨著美聯(lián)儲加息,他擔(dān)心通貨膨脹將依舊難以根除,使黃金成為一種珍貴的資產(chǎn)。他說道,就像在煤礦里的火災(zāi)一樣,我們并非總還能看到通貨膨脹,但它一直在燃燒。
格蘭特在7月接受希夫·古爾德采訪時表示:“我一直主張堅持金本位。我會繼續(xù)堅持這樣的主張,并且我注意到,人們至今沒有正視自1971年以來開始執(zhí)行的貨幣制度固有的根本缺點。”(財富中文網(wǎng))
翻譯:劉進龍
審校:汪皓
When it comes to investors, bankers, and politicians, incentives matter. Not many writers know that better than Jim Grant, a veteran commentator who has worked in financial news for over 50 years, formerly at Barron’s but for himself since 1983, as the author of the weekly newsletter Grant’s Interest Rate Observer. The bespectacled and bow-tied Grant’s columns and many books have criticized money-printing by the Federal Reserve and stressed the flawed assumptions by a character he calls “Mr. Market.” A well-timed collection was 2008’s Mr. Market Miscalculates: The Bubble Years and Beyond, which the Financial Times approvingly reviewed at the time, with John Authers celebrating the many “uncanny examples of prescience” as well as Grant’s “crackling sense of humour.” This weekend, Grant argued that the Federal Reserve has ignored incentives for nearly a decade, and the economy is paying the price for yet another miscalculation.
“The Fed is problem No. 1 in American finance,” he told?MarketWatch on Sunday, arguing the central bank has damaged markets and the economy for decades in ways that were “unintended but not entirely unforeseeable.”
Grant has foreseen many mistakes in his decades of watching markets. In 2004, for example, he warned that something was wrong at Washington Mutual—roughly four years before the bank’s collapse in September 2008. The number of risky mortgages where interest rates could be adjusted and principal payments deferred, called “Option-ARMs,” had jumped from 5% to 40% at the bank, he noted, putting average Americans at risk of losing their homes if the Fed raised rates.
“When the Fed lifted the funds rate in 1994, it caught out the hedge funds and interest rate speculators. When it raises the funds rate next time, it will catch out Mr. and Mrs. America,” Grant wrote in his 2004 column.
Time and time again over many decades, Grant has warned that rapid increases in interest rates after periods of historically low rates tend to catch both investors and CEOs off guard, leading to serious economic pain—and he sees the same pattern happening again today.
Over the past 14 months, he notes, Fed officials have jacked up interest rates at an unprecedented pace in order to fight inflation, which hit a peak of 9.1% last June. Amid healing supply chains and fading commodity prices, they managed to slow year-over-year consumer price increases to 4.9% last month, but that’s still well above their 2% target, which means more rate hikes could be on the way.
Higher rates are a big shift from what most investors and bankers have become accustomed to. For years after the Global Financial Crisis, and throughout the pandemic, the Fed kept interest rates near zero in an attempt to spur lending and investment in the economy. Grant argues that this so-called free money era incentivized investors and bankers to chase risky assets, as typically safe havens such as Treasuries, savings accounts, and investment-grade bonds didn’t generate significant returns.
“I think generally that the suppression of rates introduces all manner of distortions in the economy,” he explained. “It causes people to go and reach for growth, for yields as if they were on their hands and knees with a flashlight looking under their furniture for some return on their savings.”
The risky assets that investors fought over during 2020 and 2021 didn’t perform so well last year amid rising rates, with tech stocks falling roughly 30% and cryptocurrencies shedding $2 trillion in market cap (or two-thirds of their previous value).
Grant’s warnings echo those of another well-known financial commentator and author Edward Chancellor, who called inflation a “hangover” from central bank incompetence in early 2022. Later that year, Chancellor released The Price of Time, a history of interest rates, arguing that central banks have distorted the “natural rate of interest” many times over hundreds of years—with disastrous effects.
A goldbug’s lament
Grant believes years of low rates also led bank executives to hunt for increased yields, pushing them to invest in long-dated bonds that offered a slightly higher return but exposed them to problems if interest rates were to rise. He noted that many of the latest issues in the banking industry, including the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Bank, were related to this issue. Simply put, bankers bought assets that didn’t pay enough to cover their rising deposit expenses, and when investors noticed, it led to bank runs.
And Grant is worried that the Fed’s balance sheet has similar problems because it turned to a somewhat controversial policy called quantitative easing (QE) in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis in an attempt to spur economic growth. The central bank bought government bonds and mortgage-backed securities on the open market in hopes of increasing lending and investment in the economy and keeping interest rates low.
Grant’s many years of criticizing easy monetary policy has won him fans on the more conservative side of the political spectrum—or fans of classical economics. For instance, former Rep. Ron Paul, who became an unlikely dark horse presidential candidate in the 2012 Republican primary with his campaign to “audit the Fed,” cited Grant as his preferred replacement for Fed Chair Ben Bernanke. More recently, Grant has won positive reviews from the economics establishment for his biography of Walter Bagehot, the banker and former editor of The Economist who ironically influenced much of Bernanke’s financial firefighting during the Great Recession that followed the crash of 2008. On Sunday, Grant was criticizing Bernanke again.
“This idea that the Bernanke Fed surfaced in 2010-11, I think it is a very, very dicey proposition longer-term. I don’t think it works,” he said, referring to former Fed chair Ben Bernanke and QE. “The Fed, of course, isn’t First Republic Bank, but its balance sheet resembles that of First Republic and Silicon Valley Bank, in that it is earning 2% on its assets and paying 4-5% on its liabilities.”
Extended periods of near-zero interest rates can also incentivize increased government spending, as low rates keep the interest payments on the national debt subdued. But now, rates are rising, and with lawmakers hitting the $31.4 trillion debt ceiling in a time of increased political division, there’s growing concern that the U.S. could be unable to pay its bills—which Grant sees as at least partly a result of the Fed’s policies.
That’s why, for Grant: “The past 10 or 12 years in respect to Fed policy and the general suppression of the rate of interest” have laid the groundwork for the latest regional-banking problems and “debt drama.”
For investors, Grant says this means gold—the world’s oldest safe haven asset—is the only thing worth owning. Like his friend and supporter Ron Paul, Grant has long been what the finance world calls a “gold bug,” who thinks President Richard Nixon’s 1971 decision to leave the gold standard was a mistake, opening the door to a Fed run amok. And even now, with the Fed raising rates, he fears inflation will continue to be an issue, making gold a prized asset. Like a fire in a coal mine, we might not always see inflation, but it’s always burning, he says.
“I’m somewhat of a broken record on gold,” Grant told Schiff Gold in a July interview. “I’m going to continue with this broken record and observe that people have not yet come to terms with the essential inherent weaknesses of the monetary system that has been in place since 1971.”