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專家解釋為什么黎巴嫩和敘利亞的數(shù)千臺(tái)傳呼機(jī)會(huì)同時(shí)爆炸

專家們認(rèn)為,策劃此次襲擊需要數(shù)月甚至兩年時(shí)間。

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周二,在黎巴嫩和敘利亞,有數(shù)千名真主黨成員使用的傳呼機(jī)幾乎同時(shí)爆炸,這似乎是一場精心策劃的遠(yuǎn)程襲擊,導(dǎo)致至少九人死亡,包括一名8歲女童,還有數(shù)千人受傷。

伊朗支持的武裝組織真主黨指責(zé)以色列策劃了此次致命的爆炸襲擊,襲擊針對各種各樣的人群,而且有跡象表明這是一次策劃已久的行動(dòng)。目前無法確定此次襲擊如何執(zhí)行,而且調(diào)查人員沒有立即公布傳呼機(jī)如何被引爆。以色列軍方拒絕就此事置評。

以下是我們已經(jīng)知道的信息。

為什么此次襲擊中使用傳呼機(jī)?

真主黨領(lǐng)袖哈桑·納斯魯拉此前警告成員不要攜帶手機(jī),稱它們可能被以色列利用跟蹤真主黨的行動(dòng)。因此,該組織使用傳呼機(jī)通信。

一位真主黨高官對美聯(lián)社稱,爆炸的設(shè)備來自該組織以前未使用過的一個(gè)新品牌。這位高管(因未獲得接受媒體采訪的授權(quán)而要求匿名)并未說明傳呼機(jī)的品牌名稱或供應(yīng)商。

紐約大學(xué)(New York University)職業(yè)研究學(xué)院全球事務(wù)中心非全職講師尼古拉斯·李斯解釋稱,相比于技術(shù)更簡單的傳呼機(jī),智能手機(jī)通信被攔截的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高。

李斯表示,這類攻擊還將迫使真主黨改變通信策略。李斯曾經(jīng)是一名情報(bào)官員。他還表示,周二爆炸的幸存者可能不僅會(huì)扔掉“他們的傳呼機(jī),還有他們的手機(jī),以及平板電腦或其他電子設(shè)備”。

破壞行為如何導(dǎo)致傳呼機(jī)爆炸?

關(guān)于此次襲擊行動(dòng)如何實(shí)施,調(diào)查人員迄今為止沒有披露太多信息,但在周二出現(xiàn)了多種理論。美聯(lián)社采訪的多位專家表示,爆炸最有可能的原因是供應(yīng)鏈干擾。

傳呼機(jī)在被交付給真主黨之前,被內(nèi)置了微型爆炸物,然后可能通過無線電信號同步遠(yuǎn)程觸發(fā)。

TrustedSec安全情報(bào)總監(jiān)卡洛斯·佩雷茲表示,在襲擊發(fā)生時(shí),“電池可能有一半是爆炸物,另外一半是真正的電池?!?/p>

一位前英國陸軍拆彈專家解釋稱,爆炸裝置由5部分組成:容器、電池、觸發(fā)裝置、起爆裝置和炸藥。

這位前軍官解釋稱:“傳呼機(jī)中已經(jīng)包含了3個(gè)部分?!边@位官員目前為中東的客戶擔(dān)任顧問,因此要求匿名?!澳阒恍枰谄渲屑尤肫鸨b置和炸藥即可。”

周二,社交媒體上的安全監(jiān)控視頻顯示,在黎巴嫩的一處市場上,一臺(tái)傳呼機(jī)在一名男子的臀部爆炸,之后有兩名軍火專家也表示,爆炸似乎是微型爆炸裝置造成的。

前英國陸軍軍官和爆炸物處理專家西恩·莫爾豪斯表示:“從視頻中看,爆炸的規(guī)模與電子雷管或者微量高爆炸藥造成的爆炸類似?!?/p>

莫爾豪斯表示,這可能表明有國家力量參與其中。他補(bǔ)充說,以色列的海外情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)摩薩德的嫌疑最高,因?yàn)樗邪l(fā)動(dòng)這類襲擊的資源。

軍火專家N.R.詹森-瓊斯曾擔(dān)任澳大利亞咨詢公司Armament Research Services的董事。他也認(rèn)為,從規(guī)模和復(fù)雜程度來看,這此襲擊“絕對是國家行為”,過去以色列曾被指責(zé)發(fā)動(dòng)了這類襲擊。去年,據(jù)美聯(lián)社報(bào)道,伊朗曾指責(zé)以色列試圖通過可能爆炸的故障外國零部件破壞其彈道導(dǎo)彈項(xiàng)目,在武器使用之前將其破壞或摧毀。

此次行動(dòng)持續(xù)多長時(shí)間?

這種規(guī)模的襲擊需要長時(shí)間策劃。目前具體細(xì)節(jié)不明,但美聯(lián)社采訪的專家估計(jì),策劃時(shí)間可能長達(dá)幾個(gè)月至兩年。

李斯解釋稱,此次襲擊的復(fù)雜程度表明,幕后的策劃者已經(jīng)收集了很長時(shí)間的情報(bào)。這種規(guī)模的襲擊需要在傳呼機(jī)售出之前,就能接觸到它們;開發(fā)可嵌入這些設(shè)備的技術(shù);并且要建立可以確認(rèn)目標(biāo)攜帶傳呼機(jī)的情報(bào)來源。

在襲擊發(fā)生之前,這些被破壞的傳呼機(jī)在其使用者看來可能是正常的。來自布魯塞爾的老兵和資深政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析師伊萊賈·J·馬尼耶表示,他與真主黨成員和周二傳呼機(jī)襲擊幸存者進(jìn)行過對話。馬尼耶在該地區(qū)有37年經(jīng)驗(yàn)。他表示,傳呼機(jī)的采購時(shí)間超過了六個(gè)月。

馬尼耶說道:“六個(gè)月來,這些傳呼機(jī)一直正常運(yùn)行?!彼f道,引發(fā)爆炸的可能是一條發(fā)送到所有設(shè)備的錯(cuò)誤信息。

馬尼耶還表示,根據(jù)他與真主黨成員的對話,許多傳呼機(jī)沒有爆炸,這讓真主黨有機(jī)會(huì)對它們進(jìn)行檢查。他表示,他們檢查后得出的結(jié)論是,電路中隱藏或嵌入了3至5克高爆材料。

其他可能性是什么?

另外一種可能是,傳呼機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)中被內(nèi)置了惡意軟件,導(dǎo)致設(shè)備電池在特定時(shí)間過載,從而引起爆炸。

據(jù)一位真主黨高官和黎巴嫩安全官員表示,周二下午,傳呼機(jī)首先是變熱,然后在機(jī)主的口袋里或手中爆炸。

真主黨高官表示,這些傳呼機(jī)使用鋰離子電池,他聲稱這些傳呼機(jī)之所以爆炸,是因?yàn)橐陨械摹鞍踩袆?dòng)”,但沒有詳細(xì)說明。

鋰離子電池在過熱時(shí)會(huì)冒煙、熔化甚至著火??沙潆婁囯姵乇粡V泛用于從手機(jī)和筆記本電腦到電動(dòng)汽車等各種消費(fèi)品。鋰電池失火的溫度可能高達(dá)590攝氏度(1,100華氏度)。

莫爾豪斯等人指出,從周二的圖片和視頻來看,此次襲擊更像是小型炸藥爆炸,而不是電池過熱爆炸。

大西洋理事會(huì)(Atlantic Council)武器專家亞歷克斯·普利特薩斯表示:“鋰離子電池起火是一回事,但我從未見過電池像這樣爆炸。它看起來像是小型爆炸裝置?!?/p>

詹森-瓊斯認(rèn)同供應(yīng)鏈攻擊的可能性。他補(bǔ)充說“這種大規(guī)模行動(dòng)也引發(fā)了關(guān)于目標(biāo)選擇的問題”,他強(qiáng)調(diào)了迄今為止的傷亡人數(shù)和嚴(yán)重影響。

他說道:“爆炸襲擊的發(fā)動(dòng)者如何確保,在發(fā)動(dòng)攻擊時(shí),攻擊目標(biāo)的孩子沒有在用傳呼機(jī)?”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:劉進(jìn)龍

審校:汪皓

周二,在黎巴嫩和敘利亞,有數(shù)千名真主黨成員使用的傳呼機(jī)幾乎同時(shí)爆炸,這似乎是一場精心策劃的遠(yuǎn)程襲擊,導(dǎo)致至少九人死亡,包括一名8歲女童,還有數(shù)千人受傷。

伊朗支持的武裝組織真主黨指責(zé)以色列策劃了此次致命的爆炸襲擊,襲擊針對各種各樣的人群,而且有跡象表明這是一次策劃已久的行動(dòng)。目前無法確定此次襲擊如何執(zhí)行,而且調(diào)查人員沒有立即公布傳呼機(jī)如何被引爆。以色列軍方拒絕就此事置評。

以下是我們已經(jīng)知道的信息。

為什么此次襲擊中使用傳呼機(jī)?

真主黨領(lǐng)袖哈?!ぜ{斯魯拉此前警告成員不要攜帶手機(jī),稱它們可能被以色列利用跟蹤真主黨的行動(dòng)。因此,該組織使用傳呼機(jī)通信。

一位真主黨高官對美聯(lián)社稱,爆炸的設(shè)備來自該組織以前未使用過的一個(gè)新品牌。這位高管(因未獲得接受媒體采訪的授權(quán)而要求匿名)并未說明傳呼機(jī)的品牌名稱或供應(yīng)商。

紐約大學(xué)(New York University)職業(yè)研究學(xué)院全球事務(wù)中心非全職講師尼古拉斯·李斯解釋稱,相比于技術(shù)更簡單的傳呼機(jī),智能手機(jī)通信被攔截的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高。

李斯表示,這類攻擊還將迫使真主黨改變通信策略。李斯曾經(jīng)是一名情報(bào)官員。他還表示,周二爆炸的幸存者可能不僅會(huì)扔掉“他們的傳呼機(jī),還有他們的手機(jī),以及平板電腦或其他電子設(shè)備”。

破壞行為如何導(dǎo)致傳呼機(jī)爆炸?

關(guān)于此次襲擊行動(dòng)如何實(shí)施,調(diào)查人員迄今為止沒有披露太多信息,但在周二出現(xiàn)了多種理論。美聯(lián)社采訪的多位專家表示,爆炸最有可能的原因是供應(yīng)鏈干擾。

傳呼機(jī)在被交付給真主黨之前,被內(nèi)置了微型爆炸物,然后可能通過無線電信號同步遠(yuǎn)程觸發(fā)。

TrustedSec安全情報(bào)總監(jiān)卡洛斯·佩雷茲表示,在襲擊發(fā)生時(shí),“電池可能有一半是爆炸物,另外一半是真正的電池?!?/p>

一位前英國陸軍拆彈專家解釋稱,爆炸裝置由5部分組成:容器、電池、觸發(fā)裝置、起爆裝置和炸藥。

這位前軍官解釋稱:“傳呼機(jī)中已經(jīng)包含了3個(gè)部分。”這位官員目前為中東的客戶擔(dān)任顧問,因此要求匿名?!澳阒恍枰谄渲屑尤肫鸨b置和炸藥即可?!?/p>

周二,社交媒體上的安全監(jiān)控視頻顯示,在黎巴嫩的一處市場上,一臺(tái)傳呼機(jī)在一名男子的臀部爆炸,之后有兩名軍火專家也表示,爆炸似乎是微型爆炸裝置造成的。

前英國陸軍軍官和爆炸物處理專家西恩·莫爾豪斯表示:“從視頻中看,爆炸的規(guī)模與電子雷管或者微量高爆炸藥造成的爆炸類似?!?/p>

莫爾豪斯表示,這可能表明有國家力量參與其中。他補(bǔ)充說,以色列的海外情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)摩薩德的嫌疑最高,因?yàn)樗邪l(fā)動(dòng)這類襲擊的資源。

軍火專家N.R.詹森-瓊斯曾擔(dān)任澳大利亞咨詢公司Armament Research Services的董事。他也認(rèn)為,從規(guī)模和復(fù)雜程度來看,這此襲擊“絕對是國家行為”,過去以色列曾被指責(zé)發(fā)動(dòng)了這類襲擊。去年,據(jù)美聯(lián)社報(bào)道,伊朗曾指責(zé)以色列試圖通過可能爆炸的故障外國零部件破壞其彈道導(dǎo)彈項(xiàng)目,在武器使用之前將其破壞或摧毀。

此次行動(dòng)持續(xù)多長時(shí)間?

這種規(guī)模的襲擊需要長時(shí)間策劃。目前具體細(xì)節(jié)不明,但美聯(lián)社采訪的專家估計(jì),策劃時(shí)間可能長達(dá)幾個(gè)月至兩年。

李斯解釋稱,此次襲擊的復(fù)雜程度表明,幕后的策劃者已經(jīng)收集了很長時(shí)間的情報(bào)。這種規(guī)模的襲擊需要在傳呼機(jī)售出之前,就能接觸到它們;開發(fā)可嵌入這些設(shè)備的技術(shù);并且要建立可以確認(rèn)目標(biāo)攜帶傳呼機(jī)的情報(bào)來源。

在襲擊發(fā)生之前,這些被破壞的傳呼機(jī)在其使用者看來可能是正常的。來自布魯塞爾的老兵和資深政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析師伊萊賈·J·馬尼耶表示,他與真主黨成員和周二傳呼機(jī)襲擊幸存者進(jìn)行過對話。馬尼耶在該地區(qū)有37年經(jīng)驗(yàn)。他表示,傳呼機(jī)的采購時(shí)間超過了六個(gè)月。

馬尼耶說道:“六個(gè)月來,這些傳呼機(jī)一直正常運(yùn)行?!彼f道,引發(fā)爆炸的可能是一條發(fā)送到所有設(shè)備的錯(cuò)誤信息。

馬尼耶還表示,根據(jù)他與真主黨成員的對話,許多傳呼機(jī)沒有爆炸,這讓真主黨有機(jī)會(huì)對它們進(jìn)行檢查。他表示,他們檢查后得出的結(jié)論是,電路中隱藏或嵌入了3至5克高爆材料。

其他可能性是什么?

另外一種可能是,傳呼機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)中被內(nèi)置了惡意軟件,導(dǎo)致設(shè)備電池在特定時(shí)間過載,從而引起爆炸。

據(jù)一位真主黨高官和黎巴嫩安全官員表示,周二下午,傳呼機(jī)首先是變熱,然后在機(jī)主的口袋里或手中爆炸。

真主黨高官表示,這些傳呼機(jī)使用鋰離子電池,他聲稱這些傳呼機(jī)之所以爆炸,是因?yàn)橐陨械摹鞍踩袆?dòng)”,但沒有詳細(xì)說明。

鋰離子電池在過熱時(shí)會(huì)冒煙、熔化甚至著火??沙潆婁囯姵乇粡V泛用于從手機(jī)和筆記本電腦到電動(dòng)汽車等各種消費(fèi)品。鋰電池失火的溫度可能高達(dá)590攝氏度(1,100華氏度)。

莫爾豪斯等人指出,從周二的圖片和視頻來看,此次襲擊更像是小型炸藥爆炸,而不是電池過熱爆炸。

大西洋理事會(huì)(Atlantic Council)武器專家亞歷克斯·普利特薩斯表示:“鋰離子電池起火是一回事,但我從未見過電池像這樣爆炸。它看起來像是小型爆炸裝置?!?/p>

詹森-瓊斯認(rèn)同供應(yīng)鏈攻擊的可能性。他補(bǔ)充說“這種大規(guī)模行動(dòng)也引發(fā)了關(guān)于目標(biāo)選擇的問題”,他強(qiáng)調(diào)了迄今為止的傷亡人數(shù)和嚴(yán)重影響。

他說道:“爆炸襲擊的發(fā)動(dòng)者如何確保,在發(fā)動(dòng)攻擊時(shí),攻擊目標(biāo)的孩子沒有在用傳呼機(jī)?”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:劉進(jìn)龍

審校:汪皓

In what appears to be a sophisticated, remote attack, pagers used by hundreds of members of Hezbollah exploded almost simultaneously in Lebanon and Syria Tuesday, killing at least nine people — including an 8-year-old girl — and wounding thousands more.

The Iran-backed militant group blamed Israel for the deadly explosions, which targeted an extraordinary breadth of people and showed signs of being a long-planned operation. How the attack was executed is largely uncertain and investigators have not immediately said how the pagers were detonated. The Israeli military has declined to comment.

Here’s what we know so far.

Why were pagers used in the attack?

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah previously warned the group’s members not to carry cellphones, saying they could be used by Israel to track the group’s movements. As a result, the organization uses pagers to communicate.

A Hezbollah official told The Associated Press the exploded devices were from a new brand the group had not used before. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the press, did not identify the brand name or supplier.

Nicholas Reese, adjunct instructor at the Center for Global Affairs in New York University’s School of Professional Studies, explains smart phones carry a higher risk for intercepted communications in contrast to the more simple technology of pagers.

This type of attack will also force Hezbollah to change their communication strategies, said Reese, who previously worked as an intelligence officer, adding that survivors of Tuesday’s explosions are likely to throw away “not just their pagers, but their phones, and leaving their tablets or any other electronic devices.”

How could sabotage cause these pagers to explode?

With little disclosed from investigators so far, multiple theories have emerged Tuesday around how the attack might have been carried out. Several experts who spoke with The Associated Press suggest that the explosions were most likely the result of supply-chain interference.

Very small explosive devices may have been built into the pagers prior to their delivery to Hezbollah, and then all remotely triggered simultaneously, possibly with a radio signal.

By the time of the attack, “the battery was probably half-explosive and half-actual battery,” said Carlos Perez, director of security intelligence at TrustedSec.

A former British Army bomb disposal officer explained that an explosive device has five main components: A container, a battery, a triggering device, a detonator and an explosive charge.

“A pager has three of those already,” explained the ex-officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he now works as a consultant with clients on the Middle East. “You would only need to add the detonator and the charge.”

After security camera footage appeared on social media Tuesday purporting to show one of the pagers explode on a man’s hip in a Lebanese market, two munitions experts also said that the blast appeared to be the result of a tiny explosive device.

“Looking at the video, the size of the detonation is similar to that caused by an electric detonator alone or one that incorporates an extremely small, high-explosive charge,” said Sean Moorhouse, a former British Army officer and explosive ordinance disposal expert.

This signals involvement of a state actor, Moorhouse said. He adds that Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, the Mossad, is the most obvious suspect to have the resources to carry out such an attack.

N.R. Jenzen-Jones, an expert in military arms who is director of the Australian-based Armament Research Services, agreed that the scale and sophistication of the attack “almost certainly points to a state actor,” and that Israel had been accused of carrying out such operations in the past. Last year, AP reported that Iran accused Israel of trying to sabotage its ballistic missile program through faulty foreign parts that could explode, damaging or destroying the weapons before they could be used.

How long was this operation?

It would take a long time to plan an attack of this scale. The exact specifics are still unknown, but experts who spoke with the AP shared estimates ranging anywhere between several months to two years.

The sophistication of the attack suggests that whoever is behind it has been collecting intelligence for a long time, Reese explained. An attack of this caliber requires building the relationships needed to gain physical access to the pagers before they were sold; developing the technology that would be embedded in the devices; and developing sources who can confirm that the targets were carrying the pagers.

And it’s likely the compromised pagers seemed normal to their users for some time before the attack. Elijah J. Magnier, a Brussels-based veteran and a senior political risk analyst with over 37 years experience in the region, said he has had conversations with members of Hezbollah and survivors of Tuesday’s pager attack. He said the pagers were procured more than six months ago.

“The pagers functioned perfectly for six months,” Magnier said. What triggered the explosion, he said, appeared to be an error message sent to all the devices.

Based on his conversations with Hezbollah members, Magnier also said that many pagers didn’t go off, allowing the group to inspect them. They came to the conclusion that between 3 to 5 grams of a highly explosive material were concealed or embedded in the circuitry, he said.

What else could have happened?

Another possibility is that malware could have been inserted into the operating system of the pagers — somehow causing the device batteries to all overload at a specific time, causing them to burst into flame.

According to a Hezbollah official and Lebanese security officials, the pagers first heated up and then exploded in the pockets, or the hands, of those carrying them Tuesday afternoon.

These pagers run on lithium ion batteries, the Hezboolah official said, claiming the devices exploded as the result of being targeted from an Israeli “security operation,” without elaborating further.

When overheated, lithium ion batteries can smoke, melt and even catch on fire. Rechargeable lithium batteries are used in consumer products ranging from cellphones and laptops to electric cars. Lithium battery fires can burn up to 590 C (1,100 F).

Still, Moorhouse and others noted that images and video footage seen Tuesday more strongly resembled the detonation of small explosive charge, not an overheating battery.

“A lithium ion battery fire is one thing, but I’ve never seen one explode like that. It looks like a small explosive charge,” said Alex Plitsas, a weapons expert at the Atlantic Council.

Among those pointing to the likelihood of a supply chain attack is Jenzen-Jones, who adds that “such a large-scale operation also raises questions of targeting” — stressing the number of causalities and enormous impact reported so far.

“How can the party initiating the explosive be sure that a target’s child, for example, is not playing with the pager at the time it functions?” he said.

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