德國正在逼近一個不可逆轉的臨界點。商界領袖們對此心知肚明,德國人民有切實的感受,但政客們卻沒有提出任何解決方案。
這讓歐洲最大的經(jīng)濟體走上了一條衰退之路,并且這種趨勢無法逆轉。
在經(jīng)歷了五年經(jīng)濟停滯后,德國經(jīng)濟如今比疫情前如果增長趨勢得以延續(xù)時萎縮了5%。
更令人擔憂的是,據(jù)彭博經(jīng)濟估計,由于失去廉價的俄羅斯能源,以及大眾汽車公司(Volkswagen AG)和梅賽德斯-奔馳集團(Mercedes-Benz Group AG)難以跟上中國汽車公司的步伐,這一缺口的大部分將難以彌補。國家競爭力的下降意味著每個家庭每年大約將減少2,500歐元(2,600美元)的收入。
德國總理奧拉夫·朔爾茨在周一的信任投票中失利,由此導致的提前選舉提供了改變的契機,但經(jīng)濟日漸衰退的趨勢并沒有讓政客們產生緊迫感。德國面臨的風險在于應對政策乏善可陳,缺乏雄心,根本無法解決根本挑戰(zhàn)。
為德國公司提供戰(zhàn)略咨詢服務的未來今日研究所(Future Today Institute)的創(chuàng)始人兼首席執(zhí)行官艾米·韋布表示:“德國不會在一夜之間崩潰。這正是為什么這種情況會令人感到極其可怕。這是一個極其緩慢、非常漫長的衰退過程。這不是一家公司或者一個城市的衰退,而是整個國家的衰退,就連整個歐洲都將被其拖累?!?/p>
這意味著隨著深感不安的公司減少對德國國內的投資,德國將失去更多的能源密集型制造業(yè),出口下降。隨著生活水平的下降,選民們會尋找責任人,社會緊張局勢會導致國家急需的外國人才流失。謹慎和怨恨的有害情緒將蔓延到整個歐洲。
韋布表示:“隨著時間的推移,每個人的生活都會變得越來越糟?!?/p>
當歐洲其他地區(qū)迫切需要德國的工業(yè)力量來幫助應對來自中國的競爭、俄烏沖突以及美國日益孤立的情況下,多年的錯誤決策和糟糕的運氣卻摧毀了德國的經(jīng)濟模式。相反,德國正面臨自東西德統(tǒng)一以來最大的危機。
三十五年前,柏林墻的倒塌使德國實現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一,為了整合原先實行共產主義的東德,政府出臺了一項龐大的支出計劃。如今德國嚴重分裂,選民兩極分化,在2月份大選后上臺的新政府不太可能得到選民明確的授權。
本月早些時候,德國中央銀行(Bundesbank)行長阿希姆·納格爾在盧森堡發(fā)表講話時表示:”德國工業(yè)的競爭地位持續(xù)下降。外國市場的增長并沒有像以前一樣刺激德國工業(yè)的增長?!?/p>
在與親商派自由民主黨鬧翻后,朔爾茨向議會提交了信任投票動議,這次投票將讓他的政府落下帷幕,因為他在這次投票中毫無勝算。這將使聯(lián)邦議會選舉于2月23日提前舉行,比他任期結束的預定時間提前了七個月。但主流力量的削弱意味著政治癱瘓更加嚴重。
目前民調領先的是基督教民主黨的弗里德里?!っ窢柎?,但他的保守改革可能不足以重塑德國經(jīng)濟,為8,400萬德國人帶來繁榮。
梅爾茨希望回歸推動德國戰(zhàn)后重建的政策框架,包括低稅收、有限的監(jiān)管和基本的社會救濟等??傮w而言,這意味著政府扮演更小的角色,但也意味著他對顯著放松公共支出限制——即所謂的債務剎車——持保留態(tài)度。
梅爾茨在11月下旬接受德國國家廣播電臺(Deutschlandfunk)采訪時表示:“我們不需要一個負債累累的政府,而是需要一條解決問題根源的新政治路線。在我們徹底糾正政府支出政策之前,在債務剎車方面的立場肯定不會有改變?!?/p>
相比之下,朔爾茨所在的社會民主黨則主張,對借貸方面的憲法規(guī)則進行更實質性的修改。他們還承諾保護鋼鐵和汽車等傳統(tǒng)行業(yè)的就業(yè),并補貼能源價格以支持企業(yè)發(fā)展。
執(zhí)政的中左翼政黨排名第三,支持率約為由基民盟領導的保守派的一半,朔爾茨能否連任,一定程度上取決于一種憤世嫉俗的預期,即在女性和外國人方面經(jīng)常有爭議性言論的梅爾茨會讓選民反感。
雖然由推出過戰(zhàn)后德國總理的兩大黨組成的“大聯(lián)合政府”可能獲得議會多數(shù)席位,避免難以掌控的三方聯(lián)盟,但隨著選民因為不滿而紛紛轉投邊緣政黨,這并非萬無一失。
極右翼的德國另類選擇黨在民調中排名第二,而成立僅僅一年的左翼政黨莎拉·瓦根克內希特聯(lián)盟可能進入聯(lián)邦議會。兩者合計獲得約四分之一選民的支持。
雖然經(jīng)濟學家和商界領袖紛紛呼吁減少繁文縟節(jié)、對基礎設施進行現(xiàn)代化改造和加速數(shù)字化進程,但政治分歧可能讓德國繼續(xù)維持現(xiàn)狀,而不是轉向未來的道路。這一趨勢早在朔爾茨上任之前就已經(jīng)存在。
在安格拉·默克爾擔任德國總理的16年間,通過了有爭議的債務剎車,導致國防、交通和教育領域的投資不足。她還加深了德國對廉價俄羅斯能源的依賴,俄烏沖突爆發(fā)后,這一弱點被暴露無疑。
在11月下旬的一次活動中,前基督教民主黨總理默克爾在宣傳她的回憶錄時表示:“如果有幫助的話,你可以說都是默克爾的錯。我只是認為這樣做對國家沒有幫助?!?/p>
默克爾為她的政治遺產辯護,認為她不應為一直困擾德國的問題負責,并指出在她的四個任期中,社會民主黨(SPD)作為其中三個任期內的合作伙伴,對增加軍事裝備支出不感興趣。她還指責綠黨不愿減少監(jiān)管,盡管她從未與該環(huán)保主義政黨結盟。
根據(jù)德國經(jīng)濟專家委員會(Council of Economic Experts)的數(shù)據(jù),隨著問題越來越多,德國的增長潛力——即經(jīng)濟在不產生通貨膨脹的情況下的擴張速度——已縮小到僅0.4%。再加上周期性波動,德國頻繁接近經(jīng)濟衰退的風險正變得非?,F(xiàn)實。
政府獨立經(jīng)濟顧問小組成員、紐倫堡工業(yè)大學(Technical University of Nuremberg)教授弗洛尼卡·格林姆敦促下一屆政府采取廣泛的政治措施,以恢復德國的競爭力,她表示:“我們必須最終為企業(yè)創(chuàng)造有吸引力的條件?!?/p>
她呼吁進行類似于格哈特·施羅德總理在2000年代初提出的“2010議程”的改革。該計劃放寬了勞動力規(guī)則,并為長期經(jīng)濟擴張鋪平了道路。那次經(jīng)濟反彈也是受到對中國出口激增的推動,而中國后來成為德國先進制造業(yè)的競爭對手——以及電動汽車市場的領導者。
為了恢復競爭力,德國最終需要增加支出。根據(jù)彭博經(jīng)濟的數(shù)據(jù),僅僅為了趕上其他發(fā)達經(jīng)濟體,德國每年在基礎設施和其他公共產品上的投資就需要增加約三分之一,達到1,600億歐元。這個增長規(guī)模相當于GDP的1%以上。
即使經(jīng)濟增速回升緩解了增加借款的影響,德國政府也不太可能出臺更放松的財政政策。有人主張放寬將凈新增債務限制在GDP的0.35%的規(guī)則,盡管有這樣的聲音,但在德國分裂的政治格局中,修憲面臨巨大挑戰(zhàn)。
私營部門也在觀望。機械設備支出比疫情之前降低了9%以上。最近對家族企業(yè)的調查顯示,近一半的企業(yè)甚至不打算更換損壞的設備,原因是官僚主義和不可預測的政策。這實際上等于對努力保持世界第三大經(jīng)濟體地位的德國投下了不信任票。
在最近德國工業(yè)生產數(shù)據(jù)下滑之后,荷蘭合作銀行(Rabobank)高級宏觀策略師斯蒂芬·庫普曼在一份報告中表示,由于德國的快速去工業(yè)化,“亟需對‘德國經(jīng)濟’的實際意義進行深刻反思。迄今為止,幾乎沒有這種反思的任何跡象?!?/p>
但并非全都是壞消息。德國顯然擁有七國集團中最低的債務比率,這讓其有增加支出的余地,前提是政府有這方面的政治意愿。短期前景也有一些好消息,經(jīng)濟學家預測德國經(jīng)濟短期內會有適度復蘇。
盡管如此,貝倫伯格(Berenberg)的經(jīng)濟學家薩洛蒙·菲德勒認為:“政策制定者不能將這種短期復蘇,視為改革不再緊迫的信號?!?/p>
德國還擁有全世界近一半“隱形冠軍”——這些小公司在各自領域仍然是全球領導者。其中有許多公司屬于所謂的中小企業(yè),包括一些經(jīng)歷了戰(zhàn)爭和惡性通貨膨脹的百年老店。
赫爾曼·西蒙曾出版過多本有關這些公司的書。他表示:“他們的大多數(shù)產品是不可替代的,這帶來了一定的業(yè)務穩(wěn)定性,但這并不能保證未來萬無一失。成為未來世界領先企業(yè)的首要條件是創(chuàng)新能力?!?/p>
德國面臨的挑戰(zhàn)不容忽視。Bantleon的經(jīng)濟學家預測,德國曾經(jīng)備受推崇的汽車行業(yè)將失去市場份額,并加速將生產業(yè)務轉移到國外。結果就是該行業(yè)在未來10年內將在德國失去多達40%的附加值。
這些困難早已人盡皆知,大眾汽車因計劃關閉國內工廠而面臨罷工,舍弗勒(Schaeffler AG)、羅伯特·博世公司(Robert Bosch GmbH)和大陸集團(Continental AG)等供應商也在醞釀裁員。今年迄今為止,《財富》歐洲500強中的德國公司已經(jīng)宣布裁員超過60,000人。
德國最大的鋼鐵制造商蒂森克虜伯(Thyssenkrupp AG)就是計劃在國內裁員的公司之一。蒂森克虜伯是德國工業(yè)化進程的重要推動力量。該公司計劃在這個十年內在其鋼鐵部門裁員約40%,并關閉兩個高爐。
公司首席執(zhí)行官米格爾·洛佩茲表示:“幾十年來為世人津津樂道的德國經(jīng)濟體系的穩(wěn)定性正在崩潰?,F(xiàn)在采取行動的必要性毋庸置疑?!保ㄘ敻恢形木W(wǎng))
譯者:劉進龍
審校:汪皓
德國正在逼近一個不可逆轉的臨界點。商界領袖們對此心知肚明,德國人民有切實的感受,但政客們卻沒有提出任何解決方案。
這讓歐洲最大的經(jīng)濟體走上了一條衰退之路,并且這種趨勢無法逆轉。
在經(jīng)歷了五年經(jīng)濟停滯后,德國經(jīng)濟如今比疫情前如果增長趨勢得以延續(xù)時萎縮了5%。
更令人擔憂的是,據(jù)彭博經(jīng)濟估計,由于失去廉價的俄羅斯能源,以及大眾汽車公司(Volkswagen AG)和梅賽德斯-奔馳集團(Mercedes-Benz Group AG)難以跟上中國汽車公司的步伐,這一缺口的大部分將難以彌補。國家競爭力的下降意味著每個家庭每年大約將減少2,500歐元(2,600美元)的收入。
德國總理奧拉夫·朔爾茨在周一的信任投票中失利,由此導致的提前選舉提供了改變的契機,但經(jīng)濟日漸衰退的趨勢并沒有讓政客們產生緊迫感。德國面臨的風險在于應對政策乏善可陳,缺乏雄心,根本無法解決根本挑戰(zhàn)。
為德國公司提供戰(zhàn)略咨詢服務的未來今日研究所(Future Today Institute)的創(chuàng)始人兼首席執(zhí)行官艾米·韋布表示:“德國不會在一夜之間崩潰。這正是為什么這種情況會令人感到極其可怕。這是一個極其緩慢、非常漫長的衰退過程。這不是一家公司或者一個城市的衰退,而是整個國家的衰退,就連整個歐洲都將被其拖累?!?/p>
這意味著隨著深感不安的公司減少對德國國內的投資,德國將失去更多的能源密集型制造業(yè),出口下降。隨著生活水平的下降,選民們會尋找責任人,社會緊張局勢會導致國家急需的外國人才流失。謹慎和怨恨的有害情緒將蔓延到整個歐洲。
韋布表示:“隨著時間的推移,每個人的生活都會變得越來越糟。”
當歐洲其他地區(qū)迫切需要德國的工業(yè)力量來幫助應對來自中國的競爭、俄烏沖突以及美國日益孤立的情況下,多年的錯誤決策和糟糕的運氣卻摧毀了德國的經(jīng)濟模式。相反,德國正面臨自東西德統(tǒng)一以來最大的危機。
三十五年前,柏林墻的倒塌使德國實現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一,為了整合原先實行共產主義的東德,政府出臺了一項龐大的支出計劃。如今德國嚴重分裂,選民兩極分化,在2月份大選后上臺的新政府不太可能得到選民明確的授權。
本月早些時候,德國中央銀行(Bundesbank)行長阿希姆·納格爾在盧森堡發(fā)表講話時表示:”德國工業(yè)的競爭地位持續(xù)下降。外國市場的增長并沒有像以前一樣刺激德國工業(yè)的增長。”
在與親商派自由民主黨鬧翻后,朔爾茨向議會提交了信任投票動議,這次投票將讓他的政府落下帷幕,因為他在這次投票中毫無勝算。這將使聯(lián)邦議會選舉于2月23日提前舉行,比他任期結束的預定時間提前了七個月。但主流力量的削弱意味著政治癱瘓更加嚴重。
目前民調領先的是基督教民主黨的弗里德里?!っ窢柎?,但他的保守改革可能不足以重塑德國經(jīng)濟,為8,400萬德國人帶來繁榮。
梅爾茨希望回歸推動德國戰(zhàn)后重建的政策框架,包括低稅收、有限的監(jiān)管和基本的社會救濟等??傮w而言,這意味著政府扮演更小的角色,但也意味著他對顯著放松公共支出限制——即所謂的債務剎車——持保留態(tài)度。
梅爾茨在11月下旬接受德國國家廣播電臺(Deutschlandfunk)采訪時表示:“我們不需要一個負債累累的政府,而是需要一條解決問題根源的新政治路線。在我們徹底糾正政府支出政策之前,在債務剎車方面的立場肯定不會有改變?!?/p>
相比之下,朔爾茨所在的社會民主黨則主張,對借貸方面的憲法規(guī)則進行更實質性的修改。他們還承諾保護鋼鐵和汽車等傳統(tǒng)行業(yè)的就業(yè),并補貼能源價格以支持企業(yè)發(fā)展。
執(zhí)政的中左翼政黨排名第三,支持率約為由基民盟領導的保守派的一半,朔爾茨能否連任,一定程度上取決于一種憤世嫉俗的預期,即在女性和外國人方面經(jīng)常有爭議性言論的梅爾茨會讓選民反感。
雖然由推出過戰(zhàn)后德國總理的兩大黨組成的“大聯(lián)合政府”可能獲得議會多數(shù)席位,避免難以掌控的三方聯(lián)盟,但隨著選民因為不滿而紛紛轉投邊緣政黨,這并非萬無一失。
極右翼的德國另類選擇黨在民調中排名第二,而成立僅僅一年的左翼政黨莎拉·瓦根克內希特聯(lián)盟可能進入聯(lián)邦議會。兩者合計獲得約四分之一選民的支持。
雖然經(jīng)濟學家和商界領袖紛紛呼吁減少繁文縟節(jié)、對基礎設施進行現(xiàn)代化改造和加速數(shù)字化進程,但政治分歧可能讓德國繼續(xù)維持現(xiàn)狀,而不是轉向未來的道路。這一趨勢早在朔爾茨上任之前就已經(jīng)存在。
在安格拉·默克爾擔任德國總理的16年間,通過了有爭議的債務剎車,導致國防、交通和教育領域的投資不足。她還加深了德國對廉價俄羅斯能源的依賴,俄烏沖突爆發(fā)后,這一弱點被暴露無疑。
在11月下旬的一次活動中,前基督教民主黨總理默克爾在宣傳她的回憶錄時表示:“如果有幫助的話,你可以說都是默克爾的錯。我只是認為這樣做對國家沒有幫助。”
默克爾為她的政治遺產辯護,認為她不應為一直困擾德國的問題負責,并指出在她的四個任期中,社會民主黨(SPD)作為其中三個任期內的合作伙伴,對增加軍事裝備支出不感興趣。她還指責綠黨不愿減少監(jiān)管,盡管她從未與該環(huán)保主義政黨結盟。
根據(jù)德國經(jīng)濟專家委員會(Council of Economic Experts)的數(shù)據(jù),隨著問題越來越多,德國的增長潛力——即經(jīng)濟在不產生通貨膨脹的情況下的擴張速度——已縮小到僅0.4%。再加上周期性波動,德國頻繁接近經(jīng)濟衰退的風險正變得非常現(xiàn)實。
政府獨立經(jīng)濟顧問小組成員、紐倫堡工業(yè)大學(Technical University of Nuremberg)教授弗洛尼卡·格林姆敦促下一屆政府采取廣泛的政治措施,以恢復德國的競爭力,她表示:“我們必須最終為企業(yè)創(chuàng)造有吸引力的條件?!?/p>
她呼吁進行類似于格哈特·施羅德總理在2000年代初提出的“2010議程”的改革。該計劃放寬了勞動力規(guī)則,并為長期經(jīng)濟擴張鋪平了道路。那次經(jīng)濟反彈也是受到對中國出口激增的推動,而中國后來成為德國先進制造業(yè)的競爭對手——以及電動汽車市場的領導者。
為了恢復競爭力,德國最終需要增加支出。根據(jù)彭博經(jīng)濟的數(shù)據(jù),僅僅為了趕上其他發(fā)達經(jīng)濟體,德國每年在基礎設施和其他公共產品上的投資就需要增加約三分之一,達到1,600億歐元。這個增長規(guī)模相當于GDP的1%以上。
即使經(jīng)濟增速回升緩解了增加借款的影響,德國政府也不太可能出臺更放松的財政政策。有人主張放寬將凈新增債務限制在GDP的0.35%的規(guī)則,盡管有這樣的聲音,但在德國分裂的政治格局中,修憲面臨巨大挑戰(zhàn)。
私營部門也在觀望。機械設備支出比疫情之前降低了9%以上。最近對家族企業(yè)的調查顯示,近一半的企業(yè)甚至不打算更換損壞的設備,原因是官僚主義和不可預測的政策。這實際上等于對努力保持世界第三大經(jīng)濟體地位的德國投下了不信任票。
在最近德國工業(yè)生產數(shù)據(jù)下滑之后,荷蘭合作銀行(Rabobank)高級宏觀策略師斯蒂芬·庫普曼在一份報告中表示,由于德國的快速去工業(yè)化,“亟需對‘德國經(jīng)濟’的實際意義進行深刻反思。迄今為止,幾乎沒有這種反思的任何跡象?!?/p>
但并非全都是壞消息。德國顯然擁有七國集團中最低的債務比率,這讓其有增加支出的余地,前提是政府有這方面的政治意愿。短期前景也有一些好消息,經(jīng)濟學家預測德國經(jīng)濟短期內會有適度復蘇。
盡管如此,貝倫伯格(Berenberg)的經(jīng)濟學家薩洛蒙·菲德勒認為:“政策制定者不能將這種短期復蘇,視為改革不再緊迫的信號?!?/p>
德國還擁有全世界近一半“隱形冠軍”——這些小公司在各自領域仍然是全球領導者。其中有許多公司屬于所謂的中小企業(yè),包括一些經(jīng)歷了戰(zhàn)爭和惡性通貨膨脹的百年老店。
赫爾曼·西蒙曾出版過多本有關這些公司的書。他表示:“他們的大多數(shù)產品是不可替代的,這帶來了一定的業(yè)務穩(wěn)定性,但這并不能保證未來萬無一失。成為未來世界領先企業(yè)的首要條件是創(chuàng)新能力?!?/p>
德國面臨的挑戰(zhàn)不容忽視。Bantleon的經(jīng)濟學家預測,德國曾經(jīng)備受推崇的汽車行業(yè)將失去市場份額,并加速將生產業(yè)務轉移到國外。結果就是該行業(yè)在未來10年內將在德國失去多達40%的附加值。
這些困難早已人盡皆知,大眾汽車因計劃關閉國內工廠而面臨罷工,舍弗勒(Schaeffler AG)、羅伯特·博世公司(Robert Bosch GmbH)和大陸集團(Continental AG)等供應商也在醞釀裁員。今年迄今為止,《財富》歐洲500強中的德國公司已經(jīng)宣布裁員超過60,000人。
德國最大的鋼鐵制造商蒂森克虜伯(Thyssenkrupp AG)就是計劃在國內裁員的公司之一。蒂森克虜伯是德國工業(yè)化進程的重要推動力量。該公司計劃在這個十年內在其鋼鐵部門裁員約40%,并關閉兩個高爐。
公司首席執(zhí)行官米格爾·洛佩茲表示:“幾十年來為世人津津樂道的德國經(jīng)濟體系的穩(wěn)定性正在崩潰?,F(xiàn)在采取行動的必要性毋庸置疑?!保ㄘ敻恢形木W(wǎng))
譯者:劉進龍
審校:汪皓
Germany is reaching a point of no return. Business leaders know it, the people in the country feel it, but politicians haven’t come up with answers.
That has set Europe’s largest economy on a path of decline that threatens to become irreversible.
Following five years of stagnation, Germany’s economy is now 5% smaller than it would have been if the pre-pandemic growth trend had been maintained.
More worryingly, Bloomberg Economics estimates that the bulk of the shortfall will be tough to recover, due to structural blows such as the loss of cheap Russian energy and Volkswagen AG and Mercedes-Benz Group AG struggling to keep pace with China’s auto firms. The decline in national competitiveness means every household is worse off by about €2,500 ($2,600) a year.
With Chancellor Olaf Scholz expected to lose a confidence vote on Monday, snap elections offers a chance for a change of course, but the trend of gradual decay creates little sense of urgency. The risk is dull policy responses that lack the ambition needed to tackle underlying challenges.
“Germany doesn’t collapse overnight. That’s what makes this scenario so absolutely gut-wrenchingly terrifying,” said Amy Webb, founder and chief executive officer of Future Today Institute, which advises German companies on strategy. “It is a very slow, very protracted decline. Not of a company, not of a city, but of the entire country and Europe gets dragged down with it.”
What that looks like is Germany losing more of its energy-intensive manufacturing and exports sliding as unsettled companies rein in domestic investment. As living standards erode, voters cast around for someone to blame, and the social tensions drive away the foreign talent the country desperately needs. The toxic cocktail of caution and resentment would then ripple out across Europe.
“Everyone’s life, little by little, gets a little bit worse for the rest of their existence,” said Webb.
Years of poor decisions and some bad luck have shattered Germany’s economic model just when the rest of Europe needs its industrial muscle to help the region keep pace with China, deal with Russia’s war in Ukraine and respond to an increasingly isolationist US. Instead, the Germany is facing its biggest crisis since reunification.
Thirty-five years ago, the fall of the Berlin Wall brought Germans together behind a vast spending plan to integrate the former communist East. Now the country is bitterly divided and the polarized electorate is unlikely to issue a clear mandate for the administration that takes control after February’s election.
“The competitive position of German industry has worsened,” Joachim Nagel, president of the Bundesbank, said in a speech in Luxembourg earlier this month. “Growing foreign markets have not provided growth impulses as they did in the past.”
After falling out with the pro-business Free Democrats, Scholz is bringing down the curtain on his government by submitting to a parliamentary confidence vote that he has no chance of winning. That will trigger the snap election that’s slated for Feb. 23, seven months earlier than the scheduled end of his term. But a weaker mainstream points to more political paralysis.
Friedrich Merz is the front-runner from the Christian Democrats, but his play-it-safe reforms are unlikely to go far enough to reinvent an economy struggling to deliver prosperity for 84 million people.
Merz is looking to return to a policy framework that helped drive Germany’s postwar reconstruction, including low taxes, limited regulation and basic social handouts. Overall, that means a smaller role for the state and consequently a reluctance to significantly ease public-spending restrictions — known as the debt brake.
“We do not need a government in debt, but a new political course that tackles the root of the problems,” Merz said in an interview with Deutschlandfunk radio in late November. “Until we have made radical corrections on the expenditure side, there will certainly be no change to the debt brake.”
Scholz’s Social Democrats, by contrast, are campaigning for more meaningful changes to constitutional rules on borrowing. They’ve also vowed to protect jobs in aging sectors like steel and cars and subsidize energy prices to support companies.
The ruling center-left party is a distant third place, with about half the support of the CDU-led conservatives, and Scholz’s re-election bid is in part based on cynical expectations that Merz — prone to divisive comments about women and foreigners — turns off voters.
While a “grand coalition” of the only two parties that have fielded a postwar German chancellor might be able to secure a majority and avoid an unwieldy three-way alliance, that’s not guaranteed as frustration drives voters toward fringe parties.
The far-right Alternative for Germany, or AfD, is second place in the polls and the left-leaning Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht, or BSW, could make it into the Bundestag just a year after being formed. Combined, they have support from roughly a quarter of the electorate.
As economists and business leaders clamor for cutting red tape, modernizing infrastructure and accelerating digitalization efforts, political division threatens to keep Germany on a track that focuses on protecting the status quo rather than pivoting toward the future. That trend predates Scholz.
During Angela Merkel’s 16 years as chancellor, the controversial debt brake was passed, contributing to underinvestment in defense, transport and education. She also deepened Germany’s reliance on cheap Russian energy, a weakness that was exposed after Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
“If it helps, then you can say it’s Merkel’s fault,” the former Christian Democratic chancellor said in late November during an event promoting her memoirs. “I just think that we don’t help the country by doing that.”
Defending her legacy, Merkel argued that she isn’t to blame for the problems that have since burdened the country, saying the SPD — her partner for three of her four terms — wasn’t interested in boosting spending on military equipment. She also blamed the Greens for not wanting to reduce regulation, although she was never in alliance with the environmental group.
As the list of problems gets longer, Germany’s growth potential — the rate at which its economy can expand without generating inflation — has narrowed to just 0.4%, according to the country’s Council of Economic Experts. Add cyclical swings and a frequent flirt with recession becomes very real.
“We must finally create attractive conditions for companies,” said Veronika Grimm, a member of the government’s panel of independent economic advisers and a professor at the Technical University of Nuremberg, urging the next government to adopt a wide-ranging agenda to revive competitiveness.
She called for a reform program in similar scope and scale of the Agenda 2010 plan under Chancellor Gerhard Schr?der in the early 2000s, which loosened labor rules and helped pave the way for long-run expansion. That rebound was also propelled by a surge in exports to China, which has since become a rival in advanced manufacturing — and a leader in electric vehicles.
To revive competitiveness, Germany ultimately needs to spend more. Just to catch up with other advanced economies, the country will have to increase annual investment on infrastructure and other public goods by about a third to €160 billion, according to Bloomberg Economics. That’s a rise equivalent to more than 1% of GDP.
Even if an upturn in growth softens the impact of higher borrowing, looser fiscal policy is unlikely. Although there are discussions aimed at easing rules that limit net new debt to 0.35% of GDP, a constitutional change is challenging in Germany’s fragmented political landscape.
The private sector has also held back. Expenditures on machinery are more than 9% below pre-pandemic levels. A recent survey among family-owned companies showed nearly half aren’t even planning to replace what breaks, blaming bureaucracy and unpredictable policies. That’s effectively a no-confidence vote in an economy fighting to retain its status as third-largest in the world.
Germany’s rapid deindustrialization “necessitates a deep rethink of what ‘the German economy’ actually means,” Stefan Koopman, a senior macro strategist at Rabobank, said in a note after the latest slump in industrial production figures. “So far, there are scant indications this is happening.”
But it’s not all bleak. Germany clearly has the lowest debt ratio of any Group of Seven country, which provides scope to spend if the political will is there. The near-term outlook could also provide some tailwind, with economists predicting a modest recovery.
While that’s good news, “policymakers must not mistake this for a sign that reforms are becoming less urgent,” said Salomon Fiedler, an economist at Berenberg.
Germany is also home to nearly half of the world’s “hidden champions” — small companies that are still global leaders in their field. Many belong to the so-called Mittelstand, including some century-old stalwarts that have weathered wars and hyperinflation.
“Most of their products are irreplaceable,” said Hermann Simon, who’s written several books about these firms. “That creates some stability but provides no guarantees for the future. The first condition for being a world champion also tomorrow is innovation.”
There’s no glossing over Germany’s challenges. Economists at Bantleon predict the country’s once-vaunted automotive industry will lose market share and accelerate the relocation of production abroad. As a result, the sector will lose as much as 40% of its value-added in Germany over the next 10 years.
The struggles have burst into the open, with VW facing strikes over plans to close domestic plants and cuts looming at suppliers including Schaeffler AG, Robert Bosch GmbH and Continental AG. Overall, German firms in the Fortune 500 Europe have announced more than 60,000 layoffs so far this year.
Thyssenkrupp AG, the country’s largest steelmaker and one of the original forces behind German industrialization, is one of those cutting back at home. It plans to reduce the labor force at its steel unit by about 40% this decade and shutter two blast furnaces.
“The stability of Germany’s economic system as we’ve known it for decades is crumbling,” said Chief Executive Officer Miguel Lopez. “There is no doubting the need to act now.”