私募基金業(yè)遭遇深喉檢舉門
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????托馬斯解釋：“其實(shí)沒(méi)有人真正在監(jiān)督、檢查這些資金的用途，就連出資人也經(jīng)常忽略這一點(diǎn)。如果投資者認(rèn)為出了問(wèn)題，他們獲得信息的唯一可靠途徑就是提起訴訟。隨后他們就可能和這筆資金或者其他人失去聯(lián)系?！?/p> ????私募基金的反駁包括兩部分。首先，私募基金的行為代表其自身，而不僅僅是作為中間人參與交易的第三方。舉例來(lái)說(shuō)，如果一家公司在不借助投行的情況下向另一家公司轉(zhuǎn)讓資產(chǎn)，并沒(méi)有哪項(xiàng)法律要求這兩家公司注冊(cè)為券商。對(duì)于托馬斯的整體觀點(diǎn)，私募基金方面指出，私募基金行業(yè)已經(jīng)受到了投資顧問(wèn)條例的規(guī)范——這是多德-弗蘭克（Dodd-Frank）法案的一部分，私募基金曾就此提出反對(duì)，但以失敗告終——進(jìn)一步監(jiān)管必須經(jīng)國(guó)會(huì)立法，而不是由證監(jiān)會(huì)發(fā)號(hào)施令。 ????這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)論中特別有意思的一點(diǎn)是，目前私募基金正越來(lái)越多地和有限合伙實(shí)體分享費(fèi)用收入，比如公共養(yǎng)老金、大學(xué)所獲捐款以及非營(yíng)利基金會(huì)。實(shí)際上，2012年初以來(lái)到期的私募基金中，60%的基金將所有交易費(fèi)都轉(zhuǎn)交給了有限合伙實(shí)體。如果出于交易費(fèi)的緣故而要求私募基金公司注冊(cè)為券商，許多私募基金公司就有可能干脆選擇專門聘用投資銀行，以便將現(xiàn)金從有限合伙實(shí)體轉(zhuǎn)移到華爾街。 ????同時(shí)，一直有人擔(dān)心私募基金并不總是披露所有費(fèi)用收入。而且正如托馬斯所言，除了法院命令外，有限合伙實(shí)體幾乎沒(méi)有權(quán)力開(kāi)展調(diào)查。讓私募基金注冊(cè)為券商可能為有限合伙實(shí)體解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，只是費(fèi)用收入的下降可能抵消進(jìn)行注冊(cè)所帶來(lái)的心理安慰。換句話說(shuō)，投資者是愿意得到大多數(shù)費(fèi)用收入呢？還是愿意一無(wú)所獲？
????不過(guò)，對(duì)喬丹?托馬斯及其客戶來(lái)說(shuō)，此事關(guān)乎現(xiàn)行法律，在他們看來(lái)黑白分明。托馬斯說(shuō)：“私募基金公司有券商的所有特征，但它們還沒(méi)有注冊(cè)為券商，問(wèn)題就是這么簡(jiǎn)單?！保ㄘ?cái)富中文網(wǎng)） ????譯者：Charlie?? |
????"No one is really monitoring or examining what these funds are doing, often including their own investors," Thomas explains. "If an investor thinks something is wrong, their only real way to get information is to file suit. And then they risk losing access to that fund, and others, in the future." ????Private equity's counterargument is twofold. First, private equity funds are acting on their own behalf, rather than as a third party whose only involvement in the transaction is as a middleman. If one corporation sells assets to another corporation without the use of investment banks, for example, there is no law requiring the corporations to register as broker-dealers. As to Thomas' broader point, private equity sources point out that the industry already is regulated via the investment advisor rules -- something PE fought, and lost, as part of Dodd-Frank -- and that any additional oversight would have to be codified by Congress, not the SEC. ????What's particularly interesting about this battle is that it comes as private equity funds are sharing more and more of their fees with limited partners, such as public pension systems, university endowments and nonprofit foundations. In fact, more than 60% of funds closed since the beginning of 2012 rebate every dime of transaction fees to LPs. If private equity firms are required to register as broker-dealers because of transaction fees, many might just choose to exclusively hire investment banks -- thus transferring cash from LPs to Wall Street. ????At the same time, there are persistent concerns that private equity funds don't always disclose the existence of all incoming fees and, as Thomas said, LPs have little investigatory power outside of court-ordered discovery. Broker-dealer registration may solve this problem for LPs, although the peace of mind may be offset by the decreased fee income. In other words, would investors rather get most of all fees or all of no fees? ????For Jordan Thomas and his client, however, it comes down to a question of current law, which they see as black-and-white. "Private equity firms have all the hallmarks of being broker-dealers, but they haven't been registering as broker-dealers," Thomas says. "It's really that simple."??? |
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