安德森?霍洛維茨：為什么說我們并非處于新一輪的科技泡沫中
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????簡(jiǎn)而言之，情況已今非昔比，因?yàn)橄喔?5年，市場(chǎng)一定會(huì)有變化。安德森?霍洛維茨公司認(rèn)為，要點(diǎn)在于了解不同之處，及其會(huì)對(duì)投資回報(bào)帶來哪些利弊。正如上面的幻燈片所顯示的，該公司對(duì)市場(chǎng)仍然看多。 ????但在筆者看來，這份報(bào)告對(duì)三個(gè)重要問題過于輕描淡寫了，分別是： ????1.目前科技股的市盈率更接近20世紀(jì)90年代初的水平，而非20世紀(jì)90年代末水平，但這在很大程度上是因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)在上市的“獨(dú)角獸”公司過少。所以我們不禁要問，這真的有可比性嗎？公開市場(chǎng)投資者的確是亞馬遜和微軟等公司股價(jià)上漲的主要受益者，但2000年底到2001年有風(fēng)投支持的大量科技公司崩盤時(shí)，他們也是主要受損者。另外，對(duì)于目前鮮有“獨(dú)角獸”公司IPO的原因，一個(gè)常見解釋是雖然現(xiàn)在的公司通常比1999年成功上市的那些公司存活得久一點(diǎn)，但在未實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利以及公司治理不完善等方面非常相似。那么，會(huì)不會(huì)安德森?霍洛維茨等風(fēng)投公司就像2000年底的公開市場(chǎng)投資者那樣，正在接近拐點(diǎn)？二者結(jié)果會(huì)殊途同歸嗎？這些公司不上市確實(shí)可以積累新增價(jià)值，但另一方面，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也在增大。 ????2. 按照同樣的思路分析，這份報(bào)告稱，科技公司IPO較少是市場(chǎng)健康的一個(gè)信號(hào)。上周我曾發(fā)表文章指出，深究起來這個(gè)問題遠(yuǎn)沒有那么樂觀。而且，IPO匱乏還意味著許多“獨(dú)角獸”公司的估值尚未在公開市場(chǎng)得到驗(yàn)證。 ????3. 安德森?霍洛維茨的報(bào)告還漏掉1999年和目前的一個(gè)不同之處，即創(chuàng)始人握有控制權(quán)，或者說，風(fēng)投公司對(duì)投資對(duì)象的影響力遠(yuǎn)小于以往。當(dāng)然，出現(xiàn)這種局面的部分原因和Facebook的成功有著直接關(guān)系。Facebook始終在創(chuàng)始人控制中，而且沒有早早地把自己賣掉（這和大多數(shù)投資者以及顧問的意見相反，但安德森?霍洛維茨公司聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人馬克·安德森是個(gè)例外），這儼然是商業(yè)天才的做派。我們還不清楚這樣的變化最終會(huì)帶來什么影響，但對(duì)VC來說，挑選創(chuàng)業(yè)公司變得更關(guān)鍵，價(jià)值大大超過了像以往那樣通過經(jīng)營(yíng)創(chuàng)造增值的重要性。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)） ????譯者：Charlie ????審校：夏林 |
????In short: This time is different because there are always differences between markets that are 15 years apart. What’s important, Andreessen Horowitz believes, is understanding these differences and how they should impact investment returns (positively or negatively). As the above slide shows, the firm remains bullish. ????But there are three big issues that, from my perspective the Andreessen Horowitz presentation glosses over a bit too quickly: ????1. While it is true that today’s tech P/E multiples are closer to the early 1990’s than the late 1990’s, a big part of that is because so few of the unicorns have gone public. So is it really an apples to apples comparison? Moreover, while it is true that public equity investors were the main beneficiaries of stock price run-ups for companies like Amazon and Microsoft , they also were the primary losers when a wider swath of VC-backed tech companies collapsed in late 2000 and 2001. When trying to understand the current lack of unicorn IPOs, one common explanation is that these companies, while typically older than 1999 IPO issuers, share traits like unprofitabilty and immature corporate governance. What if VC firms like Andreessen Horowitz are nearing the same type of inflection point that public equities investors hit in late 2000? Different but the same? The flip-side of hoarding value appreciation by keeping companies private is that you’re also increasing risk. ????2. In a related vein, Andreessen Horowitz’s presentation treats the relative lack of tech IPOs as a sign of market health. As I wrote last week, there is a much less charitable way to view it. Moreover, the lack of IPOs also means that the public markets have yet to validate many of these unicorn valuations. ????3. One difference between 1999 and today that wasn’t addressed in the presentation was that of founder control, or how VCs have much less influence over portfolio companies than they did in years past. Part of this, of course, is directly related to the success of Facebook — a founder-controlled company that opted not to sell out early (against the advice of most of its investors and advisors, save for the notable exception of Marc Andreessen) in an obvious stroke of business genius. It is unclear how this change will ultimately play out, but it certainly puts much more value on startup stock-picking than on operational value-add. |
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