高盛發(fā)家秘史
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????另一次更為重大的變化出現(xiàn)在1999年——高盛成了一家上市公司。這樣的公司結(jié)構(gòu)使合伙人可以通過轉(zhuǎn)讓股份套現(xiàn)，這和高盛還是合伙企業(yè)時的情況截然相反——那時只有離開公司的高盛人才能大舉撤資，而且必須要經(jīng)過好幾年才能回籠資金。 ????史密斯寫道：“高盛還是一家私營小型合伙企業(yè)的時候，可以根據(jù)自己對長期性的解讀靈活地做出最有利的決定。有了各種各樣的外部股東后，他們的目光有長有短，目標(biāo)也各不相同，再加上高盛肩負(fù)起了要把外部股東（而不是客戶）放在首位的法律義務(wù)，這就讓對長期性的解釋和執(zhí)行變得復(fù)雜和困難得多。” ????曼迪斯說，最初他認(rèn)為改變高盛的是那次上市。但最后他相信，從20世紀(jì)80年代開始的快速增長所帶來的“組織結(jié)構(gòu)偏移”是一個重要因素。在它的影響下，高盛從秉承曼迪斯所說的“道德行為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”變成了一家只遵守“法律標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”的公司。 ????我不太確定高盛是否真的有“道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”。這家公司以自己“長期處于貪婪狀態(tài)”而自豪——但說到底也依然是貪婪。我也不知道，對于不研究社會學(xué)的人來說這些社會學(xué)方面的東西是否重要。 ????但我還是要說，這本書能讓人增長見識，而且樂在其中。不知道華爾街大公司的生活是何種面貌的人可能會覺得這本書讓他們開闊了眼界。曼迪斯談到了他和他的同事是如何癡迷于工作，以及他們怎樣為了完成任務(wù)而犧牲了一切。在他的描述中，高盛內(nèi)部的競爭極為激烈。盡管本刊最近將高盛評為最適宜工作的公司之一，但如果你想在那里成就一番事業(yè)（要不然為什么要進(jìn)入高盛？），你就得做好最充分的準(zhǔn)備，把生活排在工作之后。 ????我最喜歡這本書的部分是它的八個附錄。它們的總長度差不多是敘事部分的三分之一。這些附錄極為有用，其中包括高盛的歷史脈絡(luò)、11頁的《在高盛任職前后進(jìn)入政府工作的員工和游說者名單》以及10頁的附錄D，其中列出了1999年5月3日高盛上市時持有該公司股票的221名員工——這會讓喜歡探究財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)的讀者感到興奮。當(dāng)天市場收盤后，這221名幸運(yùn)兒持有的高盛股票的價值各不相同。其中，董事長兼首席執(zhí)行官漢克?保爾森和另外兩位大人物所持股份的價值高達(dá)205,172,466美元，而阿比?約瑟夫?科恩和尤伊?左伊等57名小角色的持股價值只有37,304,085美元。這221人的持股總價值略高于185億美元，人均83,723,195美元，而這還是在差不多15年之前。 ????這些數(shù)字告訴我們高盛的關(guān)注點(diǎn)在哪里，那就是賺錢。當(dāng)它還是一家私營公司時，合伙人的收入和財(cái)富是高度機(jī)密。而現(xiàn)在人們隨時可以查到這些信息。當(dāng)這些數(shù)據(jù)屬于私人時，高盛可以讓人放心地宣稱自己是一家高尚的企業(yè)，把客戶擺在第一位。但隨著這些數(shù)據(jù)的公開和這家公司業(yè)務(wù)的變化，人們就可以把高盛視為一架高效而且馬力強(qiáng)勁的貪婪機(jī)器。這就是現(xiàn)在的高盛，也許它一直就是這樣。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)) ????譯者：Charlie |
????A far bigger change came in 1999, when Goldman became a corporation with publicly traded stock. This structure let partners cash out by selling shares, as opposed to the partnership days, when Goldmanites couldn't make significant capital withdrawals until they left the firm, and had to take their payout over a period of years. ????"Being a small private partnership allowed Goldman the flexibility to make its own decisions about what was best in its own interpretation of long term, " Smith writes. "Having various outside shareholders all with their own time horizons and objectives, combined with Goldman's legal duty to put outside shareholders' (not clients') priorities first, makes the interpretation and execution of long term much more complicated and difficult." ????Mandis says he initially assumed that going public was what changed Goldman. However, he ultimately became convinced that "organizational drift" arising from the firm's rapid growth starting in the 1980s played a major role in transforming Goldman from an organization that upheld what he calls an "ethical standard" of behavior to merely a "legal standard." ????I'm not sure that "ethical standard" actually existed at Goldman, which prided itself on being "long-term greedy" -- but still greedy. And I'm not sure whether the sociological stuff matters to non-sociologists. ????My quibbles notwithstanding, this is an informative and interesting book. People who don't know what life in a big Wall Street firm is like will find the book enlightening. Mandis talks about how he and his colleagues were obsessed with work and sacrificed everything to get the job done. The Goldman environment he describes is insanely competitive. Even though Fortune recently named Goldman as one of the best places to work, if you want to become a big hitter at Goldman -- why else go there? -- you had best plan to subordinate your life to your job. ????One of my favorite parts of the book is its eight appendices, which total roughly a third the length of the narrative portion. The appendices are extremely useful. They include an outline of Goldman's history, and an 11-page list of "Selected Goldman Employees and Lobbyists with Government Positions (Before or After Goldman)." Then there's the financial voyeur's delight: the 10 pages of Appendix D that list the 221 Goldman employees who held stock when the company held its initial public offering on May 3, 1999. At the close of trading that day, the value of the shares owned by the lucky 221 ranged from $205,172,466 each for Hank Paulson and Goldman's two other biggest fish to a mere $37,304,085 for each of 57 small fry from Abby Joseph Cohen to Yoel Zaoui. The total: a bit over $18.5 billion, for an average of $83,723,195 each. And that was almost 15 years ago. ????Those numbers tell us what Goldman is about: making money. When Goldman was a private firm, its partners' incomes and wealth were closely guarded secrets. Now that information is readily available. When the numbers were private, Goldman could credibly proclaim itself to be a noble enterprise that put clients first. But with its numbers public and its business changed, people can see Goldman for what it is and probably always was: a high-performing, high-powered greed machine. |
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