對許多公司來說，被沃倫?巴菲特的伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司收購有一點兒傳奇色彩。伯克希爾的五大支柱，也就是五家最大的非保險子公司2014年實現(xiàn)稅前利潤124億美元，同比增長近13%。其他小型子公司當(dāng)年的利潤也增長了8%。

當(dāng)然，巴菲特的收購并非每次都物有所值，比如，樂購和Dexter Shoe。但就外部人士的角度而言，伯克希爾的策略一直都無比成功。按市場回報率計算，1965年巴菲特掌權(quán)至今，該公司股價累計上漲了1826163%。

那么，從內(nèi)部來看，情況又會如何呢？斯坦福大學(xué)商學(xué)院教授大衛(wèi)?F?拉克爾和研究人員布萊恩?塔揚(yáng)詢問了大約80位伯克希爾子公司CEO，目的是了解這些公司對巴菲特的收購以及管理風(fēng)格有何看法。

收購所需時間

通常來說，收購可以進(jìn)行得很快，也可以耗時數(shù)年。做好準(zhǔn)備后，巴菲特的行動速度相當(dāng)快。伯克希爾小型子公司（年收入低于10億美元）的首席執(zhí)行官們表示，從初步商討到正式提出收購的時間為1-2個月。大型子公司需要的時間長一些，平均為6-9個月。完成收購的時間與之類似——小型子公司為1-2個月，大型子公司為4-5個月。

立即出現(xiàn)的變化

大多數(shù)受訪者稱，收購之后自己的公司在治理方面幾乎沒有出現(xiàn)重大變化。很多時候，這些變化主要出現(xiàn)在董事會或者CEO的薪酬合同中。保險子公司的CEO說，他們調(diào)整了內(nèi)部審計和風(fēng)險管理方法。當(dāng)然，已經(jīng)上市的公司都撤銷了自己的投資者關(guān)系部門。

總之，這些CEO認(rèn)為變化較少。一位受訪者說：“唯一的變化是現(xiàn)在我會跟沃倫商討每一筆重大收購。我們的經(jīng)營方式一如既往?！?/p>

眼光放長遠(yuǎn)

子公司CEO還認(rèn)為，自己的公司在伯克希爾旗下表現(xiàn)得更好，甚至比它們繼續(xù)保持獨立還要好。受訪者將此歸結(jié)為伯克希爾的品牌價值和資金實力。還有別的原因嗎？有，伯克希爾讓這些CEO重點關(guān)注長期表現(xiàn)，這個期限要長于別的所有者可能給予他們的時間。雖然每位CEO對這個期限的具體長度看法不一（他們給出的答案從3年到50年不等），但他們都說，伯克希爾的管理層鼓勵他們把眼光放長遠(yuǎn)。

薪酬水平

受訪者在另一個問題上也態(tài)度一致——他們都認(rèn)為，在別的所有者那里能獲得更多酬勞。這些CEO都說，自己的年終獎金取決于兩項業(yè)績指標(biāo)（一般來說，大公司都采用2-4項指標(biāo)）。伯克希爾評估這些CEO的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)包括利潤、權(quán)益回報率、營業(yè)利潤率或凈利潤率。伯克希爾的股價和他們的薪酬無關(guān)，許多大公司都采取這樣的做法。

放權(quán)式管理

調(diào)查表明，巴菲特一直采用的風(fēng)格是“放權(quán)但不放任”。這些CEO每個月都向總部提交財務(wù)報表，但并不經(jīng)常跟巴菲特聯(lián)系。大多數(shù)受訪者表示，每個月或者每個季度會和巴菲特通一次電話。沒有哪位CEO就此做過事先安排，而且所有人都說是他們給巴菲特打的電話。

這些CEO指出，巴菲特也不大可能插手他們公司的事務(wù)。在出現(xiàn)勞資糾紛、供應(yīng)鏈問題、公司遭到起訴以及銷售額小幅下跌等局面時，他們都要獨立應(yīng)付。什么情況下需要和巴菲特電話聯(lián)系呢？受訪者稱，對伯克希爾的聲譽(yù)有影響的事，或者對此前披露的業(yè)績做出重大調(diào)整。一位CEO說：“別人絕不會給子公司這樣的自由?！?/p>

巴菲特退休后情況會如何

受訪的CEO都認(rèn)為，伯克希爾的子公司擁有共同的文化，那就是把重心放在誠實、正直、長期發(fā)展和客戶服務(wù)上，而且這樣的文化不會在巴菲特退休后發(fā)生改變。正如一位CEO所說：“和伯克希爾董事會以及其他伯克希爾子公司經(jīng)理接觸的越多，我對后巴菲特時期伯克希爾的未來就越有信心?！保ㄘ敻恢形木W(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

校對：詹妮

For many companies, there’s a bit of magic to being bought by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway. The company’s “Powerhouse Five,” its largest noninsurance businesses, recorded $12.4 billion in pre-tax earnings last year, up nearly 13% from the previous year. Its smaller companies also grew, increasing 8% over the year.

Of course, not all his bets have paid off (think Tesco and Dexter Shoe). But from an outsider’s perspective, Berkshire’s strategy has been a wild success. Using market returns, shares gained acumulative 1,826,163% since Buffett took the reins in 1965.

But what does it look like from the inside? Stanford Graduate School of Business professorDavid F. Larcker and Stanford GSB researcherBrian Tayan surveyed approximately 80 Berkshire subsidiary CEOs to determine how Buffett’sacquisition and management style translates on the ground.

Acquisition Time

Acquisitions in general can move quickly or take years, but Buffett moves fairly quickly when he’s ready to buy. The CEOs of Berkshire’s smaller subsidiaries (less than $1 billion in revenue) said about one to two months passed between initial acquisition discussion and a formal offer. Larger subsidiaries took longer — on average, six to nine months. Closing times also lined up similarly: Smaller firms took between one to two months to close, while larger firms took four to five months.

Immediate Changes

Most respondents said their companies experienced few major governance changes following their acquisitions. When there were changes, they were most often to the board of directors or CEO compensation contracts. Insurance subsidiary CEOs said they changed internal-audit and risk-management practices. Of course, companies that had been publicly traded eliminated their investor-relations departments.

Still, changes were relatively few, the CEOs reported. One respondent noted, “The only change is that I now discuss any major capital acquisitions with Warren. We run the business the way we always have.”

Long-Term View

The subsidiary chiefs also believe their companies’ performances are better under Berkshire (and even better than if they were stand-alone companies). Respondents point to Berkshire’s brand value and financial strength. Another reason? Berkshire lets CEOs focus on a longer performance horizon than they would expect under other ownership. Although each CEO varied on what that horizon would be, with estimates ranging from three years to 50, they all said Berkshire management encourages a long-term focus.

Compensation

Another area of agreement: Survey respondents think they’d be paid better elsewhere. All say their annual bonus is calculated with two performance measures (typically, larger corporations use 2.4 measures). Berkshire CEOs are judged on metrics such as earnings, return on equity, and operating or profit margins. None have their compensation tied to Berkshire’s stock price, which is standard practice in many large companies.

Hands-Off Management

According to the survey, Buffett lives up to his “delegation just short of abdication” style. The CEOs provide monthly financial statements to headquarters, but they have infrequent contact with Buffett. Most report having phone calls with him on a monthly or quarterly basis. None have a pre-established schedule, and all said they initiate the communication themselves.

Buffett is also unlikely to get involved in the affairs of their companies, the CEOs noted. They would handle independently issues like labor disruptions, supply-chain issues, legal action against the company, or modest declines in sales. What would bring Buffett to the phone: anything that impacts Berkshire’s reputation or a severe restatement of previously reported financial results, respondents said. One CEO noted, “No one gives a company this kind of freedom.”

Life Beyond Buffett

Each CEO who took the survey agrees that common culture is shared across Berkshire’s subsidiaries, and that culture — focused on honesty, integrity, long-term orientation, and customer service — won’t change when Buffett steps down. As one said, “The more I interact with the board at Berkshire and other Berkshire managers, the more confident I am in the future of Berkshire post-Warren.”