怎樣取代那個不可替代的人？

對伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司以及84歲的董事長兼首席執(zhí)行官沃倫?巴菲特來說，這是一個異常重要的問題。巴菲特在2016年2月發(fā)出了致股東信，而且在信中展望公司的未來。看來，對于伯克希爾的權(quán)力交接方案以及后巴菲特時期的情況，外界的猜測會越來越多。

幾位非常熟悉伯克希爾以及巴菲特的人參加了在斯坦福大學(xué)洛克公司治理中心召開的研討會，他們探討的主題是“后巴菲特時代的伯克希爾-哈撒韋：價值的持久價值”。與會者透徹分析了巴菲特用于引導(dǎo)這家公司的三項核心價值，那就是正直、自主和持久。

除了巴菲特?zé)o可匹敵的投資智慧和商業(yè)才能，固守這三大價值也有助于伯克希爾-哈撒韋成為歷史上最成功的企業(yè)之一。目前這家公司的市值約為3550億美元。與會者都認為，巴菲特從一開始就把這些價值深深植入了伯克希爾的每一層，只要繼任者堅持這些理念，伯克希爾就能在巴菲特交權(quán)之后依然保持繼續(xù)繁榮發(fā)展的最佳位置。

1、正直的名譽

投資管理公司Gardner Russo & Gardner合伙人湯姆?拉索在斯坦福拿到了法學(xué)博士/MBA雙學(xué)位。他回憶了1982年巴菲特教他們投資課程時說過的話。“沃倫在班上反復(fù)說的那些和他現(xiàn)在的發(fā)言內(nèi)容一模一樣。他先介紹了投資方面的常規(guī)內(nèi)容，然后又說，‘進行投資時你必須知道一點，那就是不可能跟壞人做成好生意’?！?/p>

作為伯克希爾首批收購的公司之一，高檔巧克力糖果零售商See’s Candies首席執(zhí)行官布拉德?金斯勒指出，伯克希爾-哈撒韋確實是個巨大的綜合體，有60多家規(guī)模各異的子公司，它們分屬多個行業(yè)，成立時間也各不相同。然而，這些子公司都團結(jié)在一項承諾之下，那就是在經(jīng)營活動中遵守職業(yè)道德。

金斯勒解釋說，正確的行事方法就好像參加橄欖球比賽，如果越線，就處于錯誤的位置：“沃倫的哲學(xué)是‘我們要在場地中央活動，并且不打算靠近那些界線。我們根本不需要這樣做，而且為了我們的聲譽著想，我們最好也不要這樣做?！?/p>

的確，伯克希爾-哈撒韋幾乎沒有違背過職業(yè)道德，僅有的幾次例外則驗證了這條原則。喬治城大學(xué)法學(xué)教授勞倫斯?坎寧安著有《后巴菲特時代的伯克希爾》（Berkshire Beyond Buffett）一書。他舉了本杰明摩爾涂料的例子。巴菲特在2000年收購了這家涂料生產(chǎn)和零售商。當時，他向經(jīng)銷商承諾，本杰明摩爾涂料將繼續(xù)跟他們合作。這些經(jīng)銷商都是遍布美國的夫妻店，而非家得寶和勞氏公司這樣的倉儲型零售企業(yè)?？矊幇仓赋觯骸翱紤]到那些大型零售商的實力，在那段時間維持這種業(yè)務(wù)模式非常困難?！?/p>

這樣做的難度是如此之大，以至于2007年上任的CEO丹尼斯?阿布拉姆斯差點兒在2012年跟勞氏簽訂了合作協(xié)議。但巴菲特發(fā)現(xiàn)了此事，隨后炒掉了阿布拉姆斯?？矊幇舱f，現(xiàn)任CEO麥克?瑟爾斯承諾保持這樣的經(jīng)營模式并堅守伯克希爾的承諾，這樣做是如此的難能可貴。他還把這種做法變成了一項競爭優(yōu)勢，說‘我們是唯一一家通過這些老式經(jīng)銷商進行銷售的大型涂料廠商和零售商?！?/p>

2、自主的力量

伯克希爾-哈撒韋的各家子公司共有30多萬名員工，在總部從事管理工作的卻只有25人，其中包括巴菲特和副董事長查理??芒格。這樣的公司高層/資產(chǎn)比例在任何商業(yè)模式中都幾乎聞所未聞。怎么能做到這一點呢？

正如伯克希爾股東拿到的持股人手冊所述，在商業(yè)決策方面，“我們幾乎都依靠放權(quán)。”這種對自主的信任已經(jīng)成為伯克希爾-哈撒韋這個品牌的標志之一。

金斯勒說：“我覺得我們成功的原因不是他告訴經(jīng)理們要干什么，而是他允許經(jīng)理們干什么。他允許他們在經(jīng)營上做決定，并按他們認為合適的方法來發(fā)展業(yè)務(wù)?！?/p>

伯克希爾從一開始就樹立了讓這些公司保留自身標識和獨立性的信念，這也是它獲得今天成就的主要原因之一。正如拉索指出的那樣：“對轉(zhuǎn)讓公司的人來說，伯克希爾是個友善的家?！?/p>

坎寧安指出，自主承諾一直都是伯克希爾吸引賣家的核心措施。舉例來說，2008年金融危機爆發(fā)后，高盛等公司都通過伯克希爾來實現(xiàn)穩(wěn)定自身投資的目的。

坎寧安說：“他們找的與其說是伯克希爾，還不如說是巴菲特。我覺得在很大程度上顯然是巴菲特。不過，我也覺得他們來找巴菲特的原因現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)成了伯克希爾的文化，那就是自主。”

伯克希爾董事蘇?德克爾補充道：“從某個角度來說，復(fù)制這些業(yè)務(wù)本身倒不怎么難，難的是找到能像巴菲特那樣吸引賣家的人?！?/p>

3、持久的承諾

與會者都認為，伯克希爾最能打動人的力量之一就是長期承諾。實際上，在巴菲特掌權(quán)的近50年時間里，伯克希爾從未出售過一家收購來的子公司。

坎寧安指出：“我覺得持久的承諾是伯克希爾的核心價值之一，也是我認為這家公司能延續(xù)下去的原因之一。把公司轉(zhuǎn)讓給伯克希爾的人會發(fā)現(xiàn)，這項承諾的吸引力極大，特別是那些已經(jīng)把企業(yè)打造成型而且希望保留其名號的家族，以及希望自己的公司在任何情況下都能穩(wěn)定運營的創(chuàng)業(yè)者?！?/p>

他還強調(diào)了建立一個公司群體并讓所有公司都具有正直、自主和持久這三項核心價值的真正力量：“通過有選擇地收購那些在文化上適合這個大家庭的公司，文化營養(yǎng)不斷得到加強。只要這個家庭中的每個成員都奉行這些價值而且不偏離它們，它幾乎就可以自行維持下去。人會做錯事，但這種文化本身的強大和持久會超出大家的預(yù)料。”

坎寧安還說：“真正的危險在于激進股東會迫使繼任者改變這樣的做法，賣掉陷入困境的子公司，告訴新的CEO要在這方面或那方面做得更好。為了建立一家不朽的企業(yè)，巴菲特已經(jīng)做了所有可能做到的事，但今后這家公司會面臨壓力?！保ㄘ敻恢形木W(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

校對：詹妮

How do you replace the irreplaceable?

It’s an especially salient question for Berkshire Hathaway and its 84-year-old Chairman and CEO Warren Buffett. Speculation about the company’s succession plan and what a post-Buffett Berkshire Hathaway will look like is mounting in advance of the company’s annual letter to shareholders, due in February, in which Buffett has promised to reveal his vision for the company’s future.

A panel of speakers, all intimately familiar with the company and its iconic leader, convened at Stanford’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance for a discussion titled “Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values.” The panelists homed in on three core values that Buffett has used to guide his company: integrity, autonomy, and permanence.

In addition to Buffett’s unparalleled mix of investment savvy and business acumen, an unswerving commitment to these three values helped make Berkshire Hathaway one of the most successful companies in history, with a market capitalization of around $355 billion. And, the panelists agreed, by embedding those values deep into every level of his company from the beginning, Buffett has put Berkshire Hathaway in the best position to thrive after he hands off the reins — so long as any successor holds true to them.

A Reputation for Integrity

Tom Russo, partner at Gardner Russo & Gardner and a JD/MBA graduate of Stanford, remembers when Buffett spoke to his investing class in 1982. “The refrains that Warren touched upon in class are really the same things he talks about today,” Russo says. “He said all the standard investment stuff, but then he said, ‘When you’re making an investment, you have to understand one thing: You can’t make a good deal with a bad person.’”

Indeed, while Berkshire Hathaway is a vast conglomerate of 60-plus businesses of different sizes, in different sectors, and founded at different times, the subsidiaries are united by a commitment to conduct their business in an ethical manner, says Brad Kinstler, CEO of See’s Candies, one of the first companies bought by Berkshire Hathaway.

The right way to do things, Kinstler explains, is to imagine a football field, where if you go outside the lines, you are in the wrong. “Warren’s philosophy would be, ‘We want to play down the center of the field. We don’t want to get anywhere close to the out-of-bounds lines. We simply don’t need to, and for our reputation, it’s best that we don’t.’”

Indeed, the rare ethical breaches at Berkshire Hathaway are exceptions that prove the rule. Consider the example of Benjamin Moore Paint, says Lawrence Cunningham, author of Berkshire Beyond Buffett and a professor of law at Georgetown University. When Berkshire acquired the paint manufacturer and retailer in 2000, Buffett promised the company’s distributors that it would continue to work with them. These were mom-and-pop shops across the country, rather than big-box retailers like Home Depot and Lowe’s. “That’s a very difficult business model to sustain these days, given the power of those big retailers,” Cunningham notes.

So difficult that Denis Abrams, who took over as CEO of Benjamin Moore in 2007, was nearing a deal with Lowe’s in 2012 — until Buffett found out about it and fired him. “Now the current CEO, Mike Searles, is committed to that model and committed to keeping that Berkshire promise, which is so valuable. And he’s turned it into a competitive advantage, saying ‘We’re the only big paint manufacturer and retailer that’s selling through those old-fashioned distributors,’” Cunningham says.

The Power of Autonomy

While more than 300,000 people work for Berkshire Hathaway in its various subsidiaries, they are overseen by a mere 25 people — including Buffett and Vice-Chairman Charlie Munger — from corporate headquarters. This ratio of corporate overhead to company assets is almost unheard of in any business setting. What makes it possible?

As stated in the Owner’s Manual distributed to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, when it comes to business decisions, “We delegate almost to the point of abdication.” This belief in autonomy has become one of the hallmarks of the Berkshire Hathaway brand.

“I think we’re successful not because he tells the managers what to do, but it’s what he allows us to do,” Kinstler says. “He allows us to make the decisions to run the businesses and develop that business as we see fit.”

This conviction from early on to let companies retain their identity and independence is a large part of what has made Berkshire Hathaway, as Russo calls it, “a virtuous home for people selling great businesses.”

Cunningham says that commitment to autonomy has been central to the company’s efforts to invite sellers. One example: After the 2008 financial collapse, companies like Goldman Sachs looked to Berkshire Hathaway for a stabilizing investment.

“Weren’t they going to Warren Buffett rather than going to Berkshire Hathaway? I think there’s obviously a huge amount to that,” Cunningham says. “But I think they went to him for reasons that are now identified as Berkshire culture: that autonomy.”

“In some ways,” Berkshire board member Sue Decker added, “the harder question is not so much the replication of the businesses themselves, but getting someone who can attract sellers in the same way that Warren has.”

The Promise of Permanence

One of the most powerfully communicated values of Berkshire Hathaway, the panel agreed, is a commitment to the long haul. In fact, Berkshire Hathaway has never, in its nearly 50-year history under Buffett, sold a subsidiary it acquired.

“That commitment of permanence is I think the single central value of Berkshire Hathaway. It’s one of the reasons why I argue the company’s built to last,” says Cunningham. “Sellers of businesses to Berkshire find that commitment extremely attractive, especially families who have built up a legacy and want to preserve the identity and entrepreneurs who are seeking security in the operation of their businesses through thick and thin.”

Cunningham also highlights the true strength of building a confederation of companies that share those core values of integrity, autonomy, and permanence. “Through a process of selective acquisitions of companies that have cultures that fit in with this family,” he says, “there’s an iterative reinforcing process of cultural sustenance. So long as everybody in the family embraces these values, and doesn’t deviate from them, it’s almost self-sustaining. People can screw it up, but the culture itself is surprisingly strong and durable.”

“The real danger,” Cunningham adds, “is activist shareholders who will pressure those successors to change that, to sell this subsidiary because it’s struggling, to tell this CEO to do better on this, that, or the other thing. He’s done everything you can possibly do to create an enduring company, but there will be pressures in the future.”